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Abstract
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) finances about 13.5 percent
of its budget outlays through user fees for overtime and unscheduled meat and
poultry inspections. User fees play an increasingly important role in financing
government programs, and FSIS has frequently requested expanded authority to
charge user fees for more of its operations. Congress has consistently rejected
the FSIS requests and has placed important restrictions on fees and the uses of
fee revenue at those agencies that have been granted more extensive user fee
authority. This report surveys the application of user-fees for financing meat and
poultry inspection programs in other countries; reviews user-fee systems in
other Federal agencies, particularly those with food and agricultural missions or
regulatory responsibilities; and discusses the relevant economics literature on
the use and design of user fees. Finally, we suggest several elements that should
underlie the structure of user fees for meat and poultry inspection, should such a
program be introduced.
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Executive Summary
User fees play an increasingly important role in financ-
ing government programs. Federal user fees accounted
for 12 percent of all Federal revenues collected in fiscal
year 1996. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) raised $85 million through user fees for overtime
meat inspections and unscheduled meat and poultry
inspections in FY 1996, about 13.5 percent of total FSIS
outlays. 
FSIS has frequently requested expanded authority to
charge user fees for its operations, but Congress has
consistently rejected the requests, despite approving
expanded user-fee authority for other Federal agencies.
Agencies that do have more extensive user-fee authori-
ty, nevertheless, have important restrictions placed on
fees and on the uses to which fee revenue can be put. In
this environment, the Economic Research Service
(ERS) investigated the use of user fees for the finance
of meat and poultry inspection. In particular, ERS
aimed to do the following:  survey the application of
user fees for financing meat and poultry inspection pro-
grams in other countries; survey user-fee systems in
other Federal agencies, particularly those with food and
agricultural missions or regulatory responsibilities; and
review the relevant economics literature on the use and
design of user fees.
ERS obtained information on 22 countries¾the 15
members of the European Community (EC) as well as
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
and New Zealand¾concerning the financing of meat
and poultry inspection in each. Twenty-one rely on user
fees for at least some funding for government meat
inspection. Some rely on a combination of public funds
and user fees, systems that resemble the current system
in the United States. Others, including all EC member
states, finance all of the costs of live animal and meat
inspections through user fees paid by inspected estab-
lishments.
Many Federal agencies now rely on user fees for at
least some funding, and new or revised user fees now
finance USDA inspections of imported food and agri-
cultural products and exported grain and rice shipments,
FDA review of new drug applications, and most activi-
ties of the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
Some inspection agencies base their user fees on hourly
charges for inspectors' time. The hourly charges can
vary with the skills required for a task and according to
the time of inspection and the volume of inspection ser-
vices to which a firm commits. Charges can also be
based on measurable outputs, rather than inputs. In
some EC countries, fees for slaughter inspection are
assessed not on the basis of inspector hours, but on the
basis of inspected carcasses. U.S. inspection agencies
also often perform lab tests and other analytical services
in addition to inspections, and they charge specific fees
for each of those services.
Agencies can match charges to actual costs of providing
services. Higher weekend and overtime rates reflect the
wages paid to inspectors for overtime and weekend
work. Some types of services may require more skilled,
and therefore more highly paid, inspectors. Firms that
can commit to the use of full-time inspector services
impose lower costs of travel and inspector downtime on
agencies. By offering rates that reflect costs, agencies
provide firms with incentives to choose lower cost ser-
vices; thus the fee structure can provide agencies with
ways to manage costs.
Agencies may have significant components of overhead
costs that arise from developing standards, performing
research, managing inspection and review, and using
Departmental support. Overhead may be paid for out of
general tax revenues, but it is frequently recovered
through user fees. Firms may be charged for overhead
in direct proportion to their use of inspection hours, but
overhead may also be recovered through volume
charges, assessed in direct proportion to the firms' vol-
ume of output, rather than to their use of inspection ser-
vices.
Advantages and Disadvantages of
Financing Through User Fees
Before choosing a structure for user fees, the FSIS
should consider four issues to decide if user fees are an
appropriate option for financing government activities.
1. Programs should be easy to administer. User fees
generate administrative costs for tracking detailed pro-
gram costs, managing revenue flows, and adjusting feesiv
over time. Fees also create policy issues, and managers
frequently devote considerable time to fee issues as they
are raised by Congress and by fee payers. The process
of collecting fees also creates compliance costs for
direct users, as each must now make, record, and review 
payment. Compliance and administrative costs will sub-
stantially exceed any administrative savings realized
through reduced support from general revenues because
the system for administering and paying for general rev-
enues remains in place. Administrative and compliance
costs will be larger the more complex is the regulatory
environment and the more diverse are the regulated
entities.
2. User fees can lead to more effective agency man-
agement. Administration of a fee system can generate
new information relating detailed program costs to reg-
ulatory activities and to program outcomes. Improved
information can allow program managers to operate
more effectively by allocating resources to their most
productive uses and by identifying reasons for unusual
cost overruns. Moreover, if firms have some choice
among inspection alternatives (such as overtime vs. reg-
ular time, or contract vs. intermittent service), then fees
that reflect an agency's true cost of services can provide
firms with incentives to use agency resources carefully,
thus indirectly conserving those resources. Fees are
more likely to improve agency effectiveness if fee col-
lection generates new sources of information, if agen-
cies carry out a wide variety of activities on a diverse
mix of plants, if fees are based on costs, if fee revenues
actually fund agency programs, and if firms can choose
among a variety of services or regulatory options.
3. Fees can lead to more stable financing of essential
services. Interest in user-fee financing frequently arises
from concerns that general revenue financing can lead
to underfunding of some activities whose benefits clear-
ly exceed costs. User fees on regulated entities are often
seen as a feasible alternative because the regulated
firms are easily identified, they may have limited oppor-
tunities to avoid paying fees, and they may prefer pay-
ing fees to the alternative of receiving poorly funded
and poorly delivered services. But user-fee financing
will not always be more stable. As a technical matter,
financial stability requires fees whose bases vary with
inspection costs. For example, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) revenues from cattle
inspection can vary sharply with transborder cattle
flows, even while inspection costs do not. As a practical
matter, fees can create coalitions among fee payers, who
may work to shift fee payments to other payers.
4. Fees can ensure that the right amounts of inspec-
tion services are used. Users compare a fee to the ben-
efits that they receive and use a government service
only as long as benefits to them exceed the fees. The
fees then provide a market test for government
services¾agencies will provide the services only as
long as the benefits to society outweigh costs.
Fees provide an accurate market test only if they actual-
ly do reflect the costs of providing services and if the
benefits flow largely to those paying the fees. In the
case of meat and poultry inspection, processors would
pay the fees, but most of the food safety benefits flow
to ultimate consumers. Consequently, processors would
compare the costs to only their part of the benefits
(ignoring benefits to the public at large) and generally
would be expected to purchase too little of the inspec-
tion service. Fees would, therefore, lead to underprovi-
sion of inspection services.
However, this primary economic criterion for evaluating
user fees may be irrelevant for meat and poultry inspec-
tion. Because inspection is mandated, the demand for
inspection is unlikely to be affected by its price (the
fee), and the imposition of fees would not affect the
level of inspection provided. If fees do not affect the
demand for the service, then charging fees can have no
positive or negative impact on the appropriate level of
service.  
User-Fee Design: Financial Management 
Three issues of financial management arise when agen-
cies try to design user fees. Each can be negotiated at
the time a program is designed, and each can affect pro-
gram performance.
1. Fee systems operate under a variety of spending
authorities. Agencies need to be aware of the ways in
which Congress, Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the Treasury, and an agency's Department can
constrain how an agency collects and spends fee rev-
enues.
2. Agencies must allow for reserve funds because
revenues may not match expenditures through the
year. Fees may all be paid during a statutorily designat-
ed payment month, while costs are incurred throughout
a year. Agencies may also need start-up funds because
initial revenue flows are modest or because fee systems
are introduced gradually. Moreover, agencies shifting to
user fees frequently retain significant accrued liabilitiesv
(such as employee benefits) from earlier periods. 
Finally, revenue flows may fall short of expectations
because of recessions or other shortfalls in activity. In
each case, agencies will need to build reserve balances,
either through a fee schedule that provides an excess of
revenues over costs in some periods or via appropria-
tions from Congress. The latter option is probably more
desirable in those cases in which agencies retain signifi-
cant accrued liabilities when they shift to user fees. 
3. Agencies need to design ways to adjust fee sched-
ules to account for inflation, productivity growth,
and changes in workload. Some statutes mandate fees
that can be adjusted only through Acts of Congress. In
other cases fee adjustments are designed into the statute.
Some adjustments are based on the rulemaking process.
Because some methods are far more difficult than oth-
ers, agencies should seek authorizing legislation that
establishes effective and flexible fee adjustment mecha-
nisms.
Designing Structures for 
User-Fee Programs
European Community directives require member states
to base user fees on the costs incurred at inspected
establishments, and the basic U.S. statutes underlying
user fees oblige agencies to base fees on costs. Costs
can be difficult to measure, particularly at the level of
specific regulatory activities, and the attribution of over-
head costs to activities can be arbitrary.  ERS believes
that three strong reasons support establishing fees that
are based on costs.
1. Agencies can better balance revenues and expens-
es through time if fees are based on costs.  Agency
workloads can change, as some tasks take on greater
importance. If fees do not reflect costs, then as under-
priced tasks grow in importance, the agency will find
that the costs associated with those tasks grow more
rapidly than the resources available for doing them. The
result will be poor agency performance, a drawdown of
financial reserves, or a request to Congress for an emer-
gency appropriation. Most likely, all three will result.
2. Fees based on costs provide more efficient use of
agency resources. Improved information can allow pro-
gram managers to operate agencies more effectively;
but the system will generate useful new cost informa-
tion only if fees are based on costs. Cost-based fees can
also affect agency efficiency indirectly by leading users
to reorganize their consumption of inspection resources
in ways that reduce inspection costs.
3. Cost-based user fees may limit political gaming by
regulated firms. If agencies establish fee systems based
on costs, they can more easily rebut charges of arbitrary
decisionmaking made by regulated entities. They can
also force interest groups to offer cost-based justifica-
tion for their own alternative proposals. Such a rule will
allow the agency to limit its own expenditure of man-
agement resources in debates over fee structures.User fees, charges that individuals or firms pay for ser-
vices received from the Federal Government, are play-
ing an increasingly important role in financing Federal
programs. In fiscal year 1996, Federal user fees
accounted for 12 percent of all Federal revenues collect-
ed (Sperry, 1998). During FY 1996, the USDA's Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) raised $85
million¾about 13.5 percent of total FSIS
outlays¾through user fees collected for overtime
inspections. But FSIS and other agencies must obtain
permission from Congress to collect user fees, and
Congress may place specific restrictions on agencies
that charge user fees.
User fees can be established in two ways.1 General
user-fee authority was established under title V of the
Independent Office Appropriations Act (IOAA) of
1952.2 The IOAA gave agencies broad authority to
assess user fees or charges on identifiable beneficiaries
by administrative regulation. Since the Act does not
authorize agencies to retain and/or use the fees that they
collect, fee revenues raised under IOAA must, in the
absence of specific authorizing legislation, be deposited
in the U.S. Treasury general fund. Authority to assess
user fees may also be granted to agencies through the
enactment of specific authorizing or appropriations leg-
islation, which may or may not authorize agencies to
use or retain the fees that they collect.
Although FSIS has the authority to charge for overtime
inspections in Federally inspected meat and poultry
slaughter and processing establishments, Congress
denied the agency's requests for authority to charge user
fees for all meat and poultry inspections (not just for
overtime) in its annual budget submissions to Congress
in 1998 and in 1986, 1987, and 1988. From 1994
through 1997, the agency requested authority to charge
user fees for inspections beyond a single scheduled and
approved shift each day (large slaughter plants typically
schedule two shifts per day). In the FY1999 budget
request, FSIS asked for authority to charge user fees for
all operations, except for FSIS funding of State inspec-
tions.3 Congress denied each request. The FSIS experi-
ence is not unique. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) included requests for user-fee authority in budget
submissions for over a decade before Congress granted
the authority to collect fees for new drug applications in
1992 legislation.
Although the IOAA provides general guidance to agen-
cies, it is not specific enough to determine the appropri-
ateness or amount of a user fee in a given situation. The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has interpreted the IOAA to mean that if a
government service provides an independent public
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1Our discussion here draws on the General Accounting Office
report, Food Related Services:  Opportunities Exist to Recover
Costs by Charging Beneficiaries (GAO: Washington, DC, March
1997).
2A complete list of abbreviations is provided in Appendix 1 at the
end of this report.
3Plants that sell in interstate commerce must be Federally inspected,
while those that sell within States can be inspected by State agen-
cies.
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tion of the benefit. But according to the latest (1993)
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), if private firms or individuals receive the pri-
mary benefits from a government service and the public
benefits are incidental, then user fees could be charged
to the private beneficiaries for the full costs of provid-
ing the service. Those fees would be deposited in the
Treasury's general fund.
Because the IOAA, the Court, and the OMB guidance
do not define the terms independent, primary, or
incidental, interpretations of these criteria often con-
flict, with different agencies applying the criteria in dif-
ferent ways. Moreover, the growth of user-fee propos-
als, programs, and revenues, set against frequent
Congressional resistance to requests for user-fee author-
ity in budget submissions suggests that there is an
unsettled framework for deciding when to rely on user
fees and how to apply them.
This USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) report:
covers the application of user fees for financing meat
inspection programs in other countries; looks at user-fee
systems in other Federal agencies, particularly those
with food and agricultural missions or regulatory
responsibilities;  reviews the relevant economics litera-
ture on user fees; and summarizes the options for food
safety agencies to consider when designing and imple-
menting a program of user fees.
2 / USDA-ERS User-Fee Financing of USDA Meat and Poultry Inspection / AER-775 ERS, with the cooperation of the International Policy
Division of FSIS, obtained information from 22 coun-
tries about their experience with user fees for meat and
poultry inspection systems. We aimed to determine the
sources of finances for inspection activities, the precise
activities, if any, that are financed through user fees, the
bases for establishing fees (some alternatives are car-
casses, inspector hours, pounds or value of inspected
meat, and fixed annual fees), and fee structures, such as
whether a country combined a fixed registration fee
with an hourly charge for an inspector's time. ERS was
also interested in which types of plants¾slaughter and
processing, export and domestic, large and small¾were
charged fees.
We surveyed officials in 10 countries: Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, and New Zealand. Some of the
10 were known to have user-fee systems, while others
were important trading partners or had large meat sec-
tors. European Community (EC) respondents alerted us
to EC-wide user-fee rules that also apply to 12 EC
nations that were not part of the original survey, bring-
ing the total surveyed to 22 countries.4
ERS sent questions to agricultural attaches at U.S.
embassies or, when possible, directly to relevant inspec-
tion agency officers. When we received their initial
answers, we generally sent an additional set of clarify-
ing questions. Because of the impersonal and distant
format, survey questions had to be precise and brief. 
We received direct responses from eight of the countries
(all except Canada and Germany, which is covered
under EC rules). We had information for Canada from a
previous report (FSIS, 1996) and obtained supplemental
information from the Internet web sites maintained by
some agencies and by international organizations. Table
1 summarizes our findings, while Appendix 2 provides
country-specific information. 
Nine of the 10 surveyed countries (all except Korea)
rely on user fees for at least some funding for govern-
ment meat and poultry inspection. In some countries,
such as Canada, Japan, and Mexico, inspection is
financed by a combination of public funds and user
fees. This arrangement resembles the current system in
the United States, where user fees (for overtime)
finance about 13.5 percent of FSIS outlays. In other
countries, such as New Zealand, user fees fund all
inspection costs, including products produced for both
the domestic and export markets, as well as operations
in slaughter establishments and in processing establish-
ments. In New Zealand, user fees also cover the indirect
costs of the inspection system, costs such as negotiating
with importing countries, setting standards, auditing
compliance, and contributions to the overhead costs of
the Ministry of Agriculture.
The responses from Denmark and the United Kingdom
indicate that all EC member states must ensure that live
animal and meat and poultry inspections are fully
financed through user fees paid by the inspected estab-
lishments. Additional EC directives aim to harmonize
fees and inspection procedures among the 15 member
countries. These steps attempt to constrain member
states from using inspection rules and financing strate-
gies in ways that would restrain trade or protect domes-
tic firms.
Most countries aim to base fees on costs actually
incurred in inspecting meat processing establishments.
The EC directive (85/73/EEC) obliges members to
recoup costs through a standard charge per animal or
through a charge based on actual expenses, such as
inspector hours. In Great Britain, costs for slaughter
inspection are based on carcass charges. Denmark bases
fees on actual costs incurred. In either case, total
charges will be broadly consonant with the costs of pro-
viding inspection services to an establishment.
Several other countries follow EC practice. In
Argentina, 67.5 percent of the National Service of
Animal Healths (SENASA) annual income comes from
slaughter fees that are assessed on a per carcass basis
(e.g., US $1.85 per head slaughtered bovine, $1.37 per
slaughtered hog, and $0.013 per slaughtered chicken or
User-Fee Financing of USDA Meat and Poultry Inspection / AER-775  USDA-ERS / 3
Chapter 2
Meat and Poultry Inspection User Fees 
in Other Countries
4In addition to Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, EC
member countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden.Country How is meat inspection financed?             How are user fees assessed?                 Are inspectors present at all times? 






























































































Public funds and user fees
Public funds only
Public funds and user fees
User fees
Fees are assessed for slaughtered ani-
mal by specie plus additional fees for
volume of production of certain activi-
ties and for paperwork etc.
For the domestic sector, registration
fees. For the export sector, a more
complex charging regime.
Based on an hourly rate for overtime
and set fees for the other categories.
Based on actual expenses for produc-
tion in both domestic and export mar-
kets.
No information provided.
Assessed per animal, or by charging
actual costs. Additional charges are
also assessed.
Fees cover expenses incurred by testing
materials and overhead. The
Government of Japan sets the upper
ceiling for the fee.
Not applicable.
Fees for veterinarians are based on offi-
cial minimum salary.
There is a complex budgeting and cost-
ing process.
Yes, present at all times during the
slaughter process.
Yes, during slaughter operations in all
export abattoirs but not necessarily dur-
ing processing operations.
No information provided.
Yes, present at all times during meat
and poultry slaughter and processing
operations. 
No information provided.
No specific response to this question.
Inspections are carried out during oper-
ating hours of the plant.
No information provided.
Inspectors remain in establishments
during operations.
Mixed requirement for the presence of
inspector depending on product (meat
or poultry) and destination of product
(domestic or export markets). 
Source: ERS/FSIS Survey of Meat Inspection Agencieshen), while 32.5 percent comes from fees on processing
activities and products such as deboning, cold cut elabo-
ration, cooked meat, offal, and tinned meat, where fees
are based on the volume of production. Canadian user
fees are based on an hourly rate for overtime and set
fees for the other categories. In Australia, annual regis-
tration fees cover the indirect expenses (standard set-
ting, compliance, negotiations), while hourly charges
finance inspection costs.
Most countries reported that inspectors are present at all
times during slaughter operations.  However, the Danish
Veterinary and Food Administration expects that with
the implementation of approved own-check programs
(that is, packer responsibility for inspection, with gov-
ernment audit) based on the Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Points (HACCP) system, the require-
ments for the permanent presence of government
inspectors will be relaxed and adjusted according to the
approved own-checks programs, the product range, and
the volume of production of the individual establish-
ments. Government inspectors would, however, still be
required to visit Danish establishments at least once
each day.
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least some funding, and the importance of user fees as a
source of funding has grown sharply in recent years.
Table 2 (p. 13) lists 21 relevant agencies that rely on
user fees; some are concerned with food or agricultural
products, some manage natural resources, and others are
regulatory agencies (FSIS has regulatory responsibilities
in the food and agricultural sector). User fees support at
least 80 percent of agency outlays at 9 of the agencies
and account for minor shares of outlays (less than 20
percent) at only 3¾in those cases, user fees finance
precisely defined operations that are a small part of
large agencies.
Our survey of user fees at Federal agencies relies on
two sources of information. First, we used the Internet
to gather a large amount of published information on
agency user fees, relying on agency web sites and on
General Accounting Office (GAO) reports (posted at
GAO and Government Printing Office (GPO) sites).
Second, we interviewed financial officers at the six
agencies listed in table 3 (p. 14): the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS), the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Grain Inspection Packers
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
We emphasize three facets of user-fee systems: the
structure of fees, financial management of fee revenues,
and efforts to control the incentive effects of specific
fees.
Fee Structures
Federal agencies rely on a wide variety of fee struc-
tures. They choose different fee structures because of
differences in the nature of agency functions and costs,
differing concerns over the disincentive effects of par-
ticular fees, and differing relationships with relevant
industries. We summarize fee structures below, using
three generic elements: 1) fees based on agency inputs,
like inspector hours; 2) fees based on distinct actions by
the payer, such as filing an application, purchasing an
international airline ticket, or requesting a test; 3) fees
based on characteristics of the payer, such as the firm's
size. Some fee systems are based on combinations of
these elements, while some rely on only one.
The Federal Grain Inspection Service of GIPSA uses a
combination of fees (table 4, p. 15). There are three cat-
egories of charges¾hourly fees that finance the direct
costs of inspection and weighing services, listed in
panel 1; fees charged for the materials and equipment
used for specific tests and weighings, in panel 2; and, in
panel 3, a set of annual fees designed to finance agency
overhead costs. Hourly charges for inspection and
weighing vary with the time of day, and they are higher
for weekends, holidays, and overtime. Hourly charges
also vary with the length of a contract: firms that com-
mit to a specified number of inspection hours pay lower
rates than firms that call for inspection services on
demand (noncontract). The agency also recovers materi-
als costs for tests separately, while labor costs for test-
ing are recovered through the hourly charges. Finally,
GIPSA recovers overhead costs through a per-ton
charge on elevator volumes. The agency sets fees on a
sliding scale: charges range from 9 cents per ton for the
first million metric tons of grain exported by an eleva-
tor, to 8.2 cents per ton for the next 500,000 tons, and
then steadily fall to 0.2 cent per ton for amounts in
excess of 7 million tons.
Hourly Inspection Charges
Agencies with inspection and grading responsibilities,
such as GIPSA, AMS (product grading), NMFS
(seafood inspection), FSIS (overtime inspection hours),
APHIS (overtime inspection hours), and the NRC (reac-
tor inspections), often base at least some of their user
fees on hourly charges for inspectors' time. Inspector
hours are easy to measure, and hourly charges match
fees to the decisions taken by fee payers and to the costs
imposed on agencies by those decisions. Most agencies
attempt to base hourly charges on full inspector costs,
including benefits, travel and downtime, and superviso-
ry expenses.
Hourly fees often vary with the nature of the service,
the time that it is provided, and the location where it is
provided (table 4). Overtime charges, for example, are
higher, as are weekend charges. NMFS charges higher
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fees in Alaska, in response to higher costs of doing
business. Firms also pay different hourly fees to NMFS,
depending on the type of inspection service, such as
HACCP or non-HACCP, in-plant inspection, lot inspec-
tion, or consultation.5 Finally, GIPSA, AMS, and
NMFS offer lower hourly rates for contract services
provided to firms that commit to pay for guaranteed
volumes of inspection services. A typical contract would
offer a lower hourly rate if the firm commits to 40 hours
per week of an inspector's services.
Varying rates allow agencies to more closely match
charges to actual costs of providing services. Clearly,
agencies will have to pay higher wages to inspectors for
overtime and weekend work, and they may have to pay
some location differentials. Some types of services may
require more skilled, and therefore more highly paid,
inspectors. Firms that commit to full-time inspector ser-
vices impose lower costs of travel and inspector down-
time on agencies. By offering rates that more closely
reflect costs, agencies can also provide firms with
incentives to choose lower cost services. The fee struc-
ture can therefore provide agencies with a way to man-
age costs. But to offer a varying hourly-rate structure,
agencies will need to develop detailed information on
thecosts to theagency of providing different services.
Hourly charges are sometimes based upon the actual
hours that an inspector spends at a plant and are some-
times based upon the agency's estimate of the hours
required to complete a particular inspection task. For
example, the NRC bases charges for each inspection for
major types of licensees (reactors and fuel cycle facili-
ties) on actual hours spent on the inspection, while it
bases charges for materials licensee inspections on the
average inspection hours for a given type of materials
license. The average inspection cost is included in annu-
al fees assessed to the various categories of materials
licensees. The former approach gives major licensees a
financial incentive to improve performance because
inspections are performance based. However, licensees
may dispute the fees assessed because they believe the
number of hours or number of inspectors is excessive.
There may be pressure for the agency to reduce the fre-
quency of inspections or the number of inspectors
assigned. 
The NRC experience may be instructive for FSIS.
Charges that are based on actual hours are easy to mea-
sure but can create conflicts between individual inspec-
tors and plant managers, especially at small plants that
are not under 40-hour contracts. At small plants, man-
agers know that each additional inspection hour adds to
the user fee, and they may frequently complain directly
to the inspector or to supervisors. Inspectors may know
plant managers well and may feel pressure to help them
reduce their inspection charges.
Some observers believe inspectors whose salaries are
paid by the inspected may no longer be objective pro-
tectors of public health. But by basing charges on the
average number of hours required for a task, FSIS can
remove such conflict by removing the link between
individual inspector actions and the fee charged to the
firm. This process would require the agency to develop
detailed and accurate data linking typical inspection
hours to a set of well-defined tasks.
Specific Fixed Charges for Tasks
The charges described above base fees on easily mea-
surable agency inputs¾inspector hours. Charges can
also be based on easily measurable outputs¾tasks per-
formed by the agency. NMFS, APHIS, GIPSA, and
AMS often perform lab tests and other analytical ser-
vices, and they charge specific fees for each service. In
some cases (see GIPSA, table 4), the fees cover only
the costs of materials and equipment associated with the
tests, while in other cases, the test fees are designed to
recover costs of laboratory hours and of shipping. To
develop accurate fees and to defend those fees against
political and legal challenges, agencies whose fees vary
with the type of test need to develop cost accounting
information that shows how costs vary with the type of
test.6 If fees for an activity do not accurately reflect
costs for services, then if that activity expands, agency
costs will grow as the agency assigns more resources to
the activity. Revenues, however, will not grow as rapid-
ly, and the agency will find itself with deficits and a
potential financial crisis.
At some agencies, inspections are discrete events, set
off by the arrival of a group of items to be inspected.
For example, APHIS inspections of imported food and
agricultural products occur when a shipment arrives at
5HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) refers to
methods of scientific quality control; HACCP plans require different
oversight techniques from Federal inspectors.
6The IOAA requires that user fees be cost-based, and legal chal-
lenges to individual fees frequently allege that the agency has not
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an entry point. A significant part of APHIS user-fee rev-
enues is based on a fixed per-passenger fee on interna-
tional air travel; these fees recover the costs of inspec-
tion and quarantine of international passengers and their
baggage. APHIS also charges separate user fees for
inspection and clearance of international aircraft and
their cargo, and for inspection and clearance of ships,
trucks, and their cargo in international transit. APHIS
Veterinary Service fees are charged on incoming loads
of imported live animals, whose arrival triggers inspec-
tion actions that differ from aircraft, ship, or truck
inspections. These fees are based on an action¾inspec-
tion of cargo, luggage, and carrier¾rather than being
directly based on inspector hours. An agency that wish-
es to develop this type of system must develop a costing
system that allows the agency to link labor and manage-
ment hours, materials, and capital to different types of
inspection tasks if the agency hopes to develop accurate
fees that can withstand political and legal challenges
and that can be adjusted with changes in regulatory
activities.
At other agencies, regulatory actions and the costs that
the actions generate are initiated by filings. For exam-
ple, filing a New Drug Application with the FDA leads
to the substantial commitment of FDA resources for
review. Similarly, when a firm files for patent or trade-
mark protection at the Patent and Trademark Office or
when a firm files for copyright protection at the Library
of Congress, those actions generate expenditures
because the regulatory agencies review the applications.
These costs are recovered through application fees. The
NRC licenses nuclear reactors and facilities, such as
hospitals, irradiators, and radiographers, that use nuclear
materials as part of their operations. The agency recov-
ers the costs of license review through license fees. For
those agencies, fee structures should, in principle,
reflect differences in the costs imposed by different
types of filings. Because application fees can, in some
cases, be quite large, those agencies often aim to struc-
ture fees to avoid disincentive problems.
Charges for Overhead Recovery
Agencies may have significant components of overhead
costs that are not directly caused by specific inspection
or review actions. These can include costs of develop-
ing standards, performing research, managing inspec-
tion and review, and Departmental support for the
agency. They can also include costs for inspection and
review actions whose user fees are set below the costs
of providing services, and can include pension and
health benefits. Some of these costs may be paid for out
of general tax revenues. For example, GIPSA costs for
development of standards and testing methods, and for
compliance, are not recovered through that agency's
user fees. In other cases, overhead costs must be recov-
ered through user-fee charges, and agencies have devel-
oped a variety of ways to do so.
In some cases, overhead costs are recovered by adding
overhead expenses to hourly inspection charges. AMS
takes this approach when setting fees for beef-grading
services, by charging a firm for overhead in direct pro-
portion to its use of grading hours. But AMS takes a
different approach for its poultry-grading services. AMS
covers overhead charges through a charge on the vol-
ume of graded poultry; poultry producers, therefore, pay
for overhead in direct proportion to their volume of out-
put rather than to their use of AMS services. GIPSA
recovers overhead expenses for its smaller programs,
such as rice inspection and contract-compliance ser-
vices, through charges based on inspection hours. But
GIPSA recovers overhead expenses in grain inspection,
as shown in table 3, through a separate sliding charge
per metric ton of outgoing grain from export elevators.
An agency might choose to rely on a separate volume-
based overhead charge out of concern that high hourly
rates might lead to disincentive effects. If overhead
charges lead to high hourly inspection rates, then firms
may lose the connection between the services they
receive and the charges they are assessed. Some might
be adversely affected by a high hourly rate, and some
firms might avoid using hourly services. 
Many overhead activities are not directly attributable to
the actions of individual firms; instead, they may be
thought of simply as costs associated with having an
inspection system. If such costs are unaffected by the
actions of individual plants, then there will be no way
of basing specific overhead charges on costs at specific
firms. Provided that overhead expenses are to be
financed through user fees, the financing goal shifts to
setting overhead charges to recover expenses without
inducing firms to change their normal ways of doing
business. 
Financial Management
We address three issues of financial management. First,
Congress, OMB, the Treasury Department, and an
agency's Department can greatly constrain the ways in
which agencies can collect and spend user-fee revenues,
and they can do so unintentionally. An agency that is
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tion to obtaining the appropriate authorities to collect
and spend the associated revenues. Second, providing
that agencies gain the requisite authority to spend rev-
enues, they may face problems of matching revenue
flows to expenditure flows and will need to design
financial methods of doing so. Finally, agencies need to
design ways to adjust fee schedules over time to
account for inflation, productivity growth, changes in
workload, and changes in inspection goals. Some meth-
ods of adjustment are more difficult than others, and
agencies should carefully design an adjustment mecha-
nism when user-fee authority is obtained to avoid being
locked into an inferior mechanism.
Spending Authority
An agency that receives the authority to collect user
fees won't necessarily have the authority to spend the
revenue from those fees. Some agencies, such as AMS,
NMFS, and GIPSA, have the authority to spend fee rev-
enues toward support of agency actions, thus creating a
direct link between user-fee payments and correspond-
ing Government services. Congress may, nevertheless,
constrain such agencies' budgets by placing annual lim-
its on spending authority.
Separate spending authorities are required for the
income generated from reserves in trust funds or
Treasury accounts, which, with specific legislative
authorization, can earn interest. AMS and GIPSA each
have investment authority. They can manage the invest-
ment of those funds in insured or collateralized securi-
ties, and they have the right to spend earnings on those
investments.
Other agencies have the authority to collect fees but no
authority to spend them; in those cases, fees will most
closely approximate specific taxes. For example,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and NRC
fee revenues are deposited directly to the U.S. Treasury,
not in agency accounts. Congress continues to appropri-
ate funds each year for those agencies and directs them
to set fees to yield revenues that match appropriated
funding. 
Congress may also choose statutory spending authori-
ties that fall between the two extremes. The FDA's
statutory framework for prescription-drug user fees is
carefully crafted to ensure that appropriated funds sup-
port a continuing base of resources for review of new
drug applications. User fees support new spending
authority for additional resources needed to expedite the
review process. In this situation, user fees do not offset
appropriated funds but instead are authorized to add to
those funds. 
Congress sometimes changes agency spending authori-
ty. APHIS originally had no spending authority for agri-
cultural quarantine and inspection (AQI) user fees
beyond that authorized by Congress in the annual bud-
get. That constraint has changed through time. Today,
APHIS can spend revenues in excess of authorized
spending. But because APHIS has no trust fund to bank
those funds and because the excess of revenues above
authorized spending can fluctuate substantially from
year to year, APHIS has difficulty planning for the use
of the excess funds. In 2003, the agency will assume
complete spending authority over AQI user revenues.
Expansive spending authority provides agencies with
greater discretion in decisionmaking, while limitations
on spending authority restrict agency discretion and
place greater responsibility in the hands of
Congressional and executive branch oversight institu-
tions. Expanded agency discretion will have the greatest
effects in those agencies with extensive latitude for
adjusting the types and amounts of services that they
deliver. For example, at AMS, the agency pursues the
development of new tests, grades, and standards of
identity for products. Because AMS services are volun-
tary and because the agency is financed largely through
fee revenues, AMS has strong incentives to develop ser-
vices that industry is willing to pay for. If AMS were
financed entirely out of General Fund revenues, then
innovations in service delivery would generate no finan-
cial return for the agency. Innovations would be less
likely to be introduced except insofar as Congress
directed the new actions and wrote new financing into
the budget. 
The NRC is a regulatory agency and, therefore, will
necessarily have a more adversarial relationship with
industry than AMS does. When Congress directed the
NRC to collect fees without granting it spending author-
ity over the revenues, Congress aimed to avoid creating
conflicts of interest by eliminating the link between the
agency's revenues and specific enforcement actions.
But limitations on spending authority may not succeed
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sions and may create a more contentious regulatory
environment. Under its current user-fee system, the
NRC budget is equal to total fee revenue and represents
a substantial direct cost to industry. If the industry can
persuade Congressional budget and appropriations com-
mittees to reduce the NRC budget, then it can directly
reduce its own costs and can also limit the agency's reg-
ulatory scope. The method of agency finance means that
agency regulatory activity now comes under heightened
scrutiny from more committees with competing juris-
dictions. Among the agencies that we interviewed, NRC
clearly experiences the most adversarial relationship
with its regulated firms, and a significant part of the
contention may arise from the incentives introduced by
the peculiarities of agency finance. 
The situation stands in contrast to FDA-industry rela-
tions over user fees. The FDA is also a regulatory
agency, but FDA user fees provide financing for a goal
desired by both the agency and the industry¾expedited
review of new drug applications. Expedited review
serves public health goals by putting effective new pre-
scription drugs on the market more quickly and by
lengthening the actual patent lives of new drugs, there-
by making them more profitable. NRC user fees do not
provide for better regulation or for services desired by
industry,andthus theyintensifyagency-industryconflicts.
Matching Revenue to Expenditure Flows
Agencies often need start-up funds when user-fee sys-
tems are introduced. Typically, initial revenue flows
may be modest because firms will not be billed until 30
days of service are provided, and then firms have an
additional 30 days to pay. If firms are delinquent in pay-
ment, revenue flows will be further reduced. Agencies
also may have substantial amounts of accrued liabilities
for employee compensation at the time of fee introduc-
tion. Liabilities may take the form of accrued leave bal-
ances, workers compensation payment liabilities, shut-
down costs for office closures, severance pay, and
unemployment costs. Congress may need to provide
appropriations, in the amount of employee accrued lia-
bilities, to a program that is moving to user fees.
Agencies also need to build reserve funds because user-
fee revenues may not match expenditures throughout a
year. For example, under the FDA's system, fixed per-
plant and per-drug payments must be received by
January 31. The result is that revenue flows are far
below expenditure flows in the first third of the fiscal
year and then a large stock of funds is received at the
end of the first third (Jan. 31st), that will be drawn on
throughout the year. 
Other flows are not as deterministic. APHIS Veterinary
Service revenue flows have fluctuated unexpectedly in
response to sharp fluctuations in the movement of cattle
in and out of Mexico for feeding, and APHIS AQI inter-
national air passenger revenue flows could fluctuate
sharply as international air travel varies. In neither case
do APHIS costs vary as quickly because the fixed costs
of APHIS inspection and quarantine facilities do not
vary with short-term changes in volumes.  
Some agencies, such as AMS, GIPSA, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Forest Service,
maintain dedicated trust funds for holding revenues.
Others, such as APHIS and FDA, do not maintain trust
funds but have Treasury expenditure accounts. In either
case, agencies strive to maintain a reserve balance;
AMS attempts to maintain a balance equal to 4 months'
expenditures, while GIPSA aims for 3 months' expendi-
tures. The desired reserve balance will be larger as
flows are more variable. The FAA, whose fee revenue
depends on highly variable movements in air travel, has
maintained reserves of over a year. To build reserve bal-
ances, agencies will need either appropriations from
Congress or a fee schedule that provides for collection
of revenues for both current and accrued liabilities.
Temporal Adjustments 
Agency costs and general inflation may rise over time,
or new technologies may allow agencies to perform
their missions with fewer resources, thereby lowering
costs. In either case, agencies will need to adjust the
level and structure of fees to continue to match rev-
enues to expenditures.
The most difficult fees to adjust are those specifically
written into a statute, such as those for the Customs
Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
because an Act of Congress is required to change them.
Alternatively, actual fees may be set in a rulemaking
procedure with legislation providing the authority and
defining the coverage of fees. Some agencies then
attempt to change fees in annual rulemakings; such
strategies are easier than passing Acts of Congress but
are still rather cumbersome. The NRC, for example, iscurrently required by statute to establish, through annual
rulemaking, fees to recover 100 percent of its budget
authority, less amounts for high-level waste activities
for the Department of Energy. But the NRC cannot
begin the rulemaking until the annual appropriation is
passed, a stipulation that frequently places the agency
under a very tight time schedule. 
APHIS sets a 5-year schedule of annually escalating
fees in a single rulemaking, thus reducing the regulatory
burden on the agency and on payers. A 5-year schedule
can be risky if the agency underestimates future infla-
tion or, in APHIS' case, if a future recession leads to a
sharp downturn in air travel. APHIS asserts that it has
budgeted cautiously, setting relatively high near-term
fees to build a reserve and provide for modest annual
increases. The agency also retains the option of chang-
ing fees through the regulatory process.
Finally, an agency may try to include an automatic esca-
lator in its fee structure. FDA fees are adjusted annually
in accordance with the changes in inflation and then
revisited by all parties when the law is reauthorized
every 5 years. 
Incentive Issues
User-fee systems that are designed to finance operations
may also induce some changes in firms' behavior. Some
behavioral changes affect agency costs and efficiency.
For example, firms faced with a choice of paying high
fees for high-cost services or low fees for low-cost ser-
vices may reorganize their own operations to purchase
low-cost services, thus leading to declines in total
agency costs and revenues. Other behavioral changes
may affect an agency's mission, and the agency may
take steps to modify behavioral changes that harm the
agency's mission and encourage changes that support
the mission. We surveyed some examples of incentive
strategies below.
Fee Adjustments and Incentives
In some cases, agencies adjust fees because they believe
that high fees on some specific service will discourage
behavior that is in the larger public interest. For exam-
ple, APHIS does not charge fees for certain animal tests
(brucellosis, tuberculosis, and Salmonella, for example),
because the agency is concerned that fees will discour-
age the use of the tests. APHIS also argues that the
information gained from such tests is of substantial
value to the general public and not just to the fee payer.
The NRC exempts nonprofit educational institutions
from fees on the grounds that their production of new
knowledge through research is a public good.
The FDA's user-fee program faces some potentially
strong disincentives, and the agency devised a strategy
to avoid them. User fees at the FDA are designed to
finance expanded FDA drug-review operations. Those
operations occur in two administrative phases: the
Investigation of New Drug (IND) authorization and the
New Drug Approval (NDA) application. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers apply for IND authorization at an early
research stage before they begin testing drugs for safety
and efficacy. NDA applications are made after testing to
receive approval for marketing. FDA does not charge
IND user fees but instead finances that program out of
other fees because it fears that IND fees might discour-
age drug research. For similar reasons, the agency also
does not charge NDA fees for orphan drugs (drugs hav-
ing very small potential markets), for the first drug
application filed by a new business, or when the
Secretary of Health and Human Services finds that a
waiver is necessary to protect the public health. FDA
activities in those areas are funded through other user
fees. Regulatory compliance costs, such as routine plant
inspections and post-market surveillance, are not funded
by user fees. 
FDA user-fee revenue is projected to reach $117 million
in 1998. If the entire $117 million were to be recovered
from fees on remaining (unexempted) NDA's only, the
fee would be almost $800,000 per application. There is
concern that fees of this magnitude could discourage
attempts to market new drugs. The statute (the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act) redesigned the NDA
fee to remove that disincentive by breaking the NDA
fee into three parts. The charge per NDA was reduced
by two-thirds to slightly over $250,000 per application
in 1998. One-third of the money was to be recovered by
a fixed charge on each manufacturing plant in the indus-
try (275 plants, for a 1998 fee of $142,000 per plant).
The other third was to be recovered through a fixed
charge on each existing listed prescription drug (2,100
drugs, for a 1998 fee of about $18,600 per listed drug).
The fixed charges will not affect drug pricing or
research, and they are low enough that no plants would
close and no drugs would be delisted (in contrast to the
meat sector, drug plants are all relatively large). The fee
structure is designed to take the money from profits
rather than in the form of higher prices. Drug firms
accepted this strategy because the added revenue allows
for accelerated review of NDA's and, therefore, in earli-
er marketing of approved drugs and in an effective
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lengthening of patent lives. In turn, earlier marketing
allows for expanded consumer benefits, and lengthened
patent lives add to firms' profits.
In other cases, user-fee structures can change industry
behavior in ways that do not necessarily harm the goals
of public policy but do have important effects on
agency finances and operations. For example, in
seafood inspection, firms may choose among combina-
tions of inspection/certification services offered by
NMFS. Some have chosen to take HACCP certification
while dropping continuous in-plant inspections. HACCP
services are priced higher on an hourly basis because
they require more highly trained inspectors and because
HACCP inspectors spend more time in training and in
out-of-plant review. But HACCP services also imply
fewer inspector hours annually for a given volume of
product, and the shift to HACCP has led to declines in
NMFS revenues, workload, and inspector workforce.
Agencies must be flexible enough to respond to indus-
tries' reactions to changes in fee structures and service
offerings.
Congressional authorizations for fees can create incen-
tive problems. For example, legislation requires the
NRC to recover 100 percent of its budget authority
through fees. Costs that are not recovered through
licensing and inspection fees, including costs for activi-
ties that do not directly benefit licensees, are to be
recovered through annual fees assessed to NRC
licensees. For some commercial reactors, the sum of
these fees can amount to $4 million annually. At aging
reactors, firms can avoid these fees by shutting down
operations; thus the fee structure (quite large for operat-
ing reactors, zero for closed facilities) can affect a firm's
operating decisions. Because agency costs for inspec-
tion, regulation of waste, and research do not disappear
when a facility ceases operations, costs must then be
recovered through increased fees on operating facilities,
which then exacerbates the incentive problem. The
problem is that authorizing legislation departs from the
rule that those who cause changes in agency costs
should be those who bear the burden of the fees.
Information and Incentives
NMFS conducts a voluntary inspection program for
fishery products that is financed by user fees. The ser-
vices offered include HACCP-based establishment
reviews and inspections, IQA (integrated quality assur-
ance) establishment review and inspection (IQA relies
more heavily than HACCP on end-product testing, as
opposed to process monitoring), continuous in-plant
inspection of processes and products, and product grad-
ing, product lot inspection, lab analyses, training, and
consultation. User fees are based on service costs. Firms
that choose to have no inspection pay nothing, those
that choose lot inspection pay less than those that
choose continuous inspection, and those that choose
HACCP-based inspection pay higher hourly fees than
those that do not choose HACCP.
Firms do have some incentives to choose the higher
cost, more intensive inspection services. NMFS allows
firms to mark products with inspection indicators. Thus,
products produced under HACCP procedures can carry
a label that says so. Similarly, products produced under
continuous Federal inspection can carry labels that iden-
tify them, and products may also carry grades. Products
that are lot inspected may carry labels that attest merely
to the specific product claims made and tested for. By
designing an information system for buyers, the NMFS
system provides consumers with indicators of product
quality and provides plants with incentives to invest in
product quality.
Incentives for Gaming Fees
User fees are rarely imposed when affected industries
offer strong and unified opposition. The views of indus-
try representatives are important in deciding which
activities will be financed by user fees, how fees will be
structured, and how fee revenue will be used. Most
agencies regulate a variety of firms with diverse inter-
ests; for example, firms in the meat industry can align
among different interests represented by species (cattle,
hogs, lambs, chickens, turkeys), process (slaughter, pro-
cessing), or size. When fees are not based on the costs
of providing service, but rather on more arbitrary bases,
fee payers may form coalitions to influence the fee
structure. One coalition of fee payers will offer propos-
als that effectively shift fee payments to other payers.
Agency leadership will spend a lot of time analyzing
and responding to these proposals from competing
interest groups, especially when fee structures are fre-
quently revised either through statutory review or
through a rulemaking process.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
received most of its funding since 1970 from the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which in turn receives
most of its funding from a 10 percent tax on domestic
airline tickets. The trust fund finances FAA's invest-
ments, such as construction and safety improvements at
airports and technological upgrades to the air traffic
control system. The FAA also provides a wide variety ofUser-Fee Financing of USDA Meat and Poultry Inspection / AER-775  USDA-ERS / 13
services, such as air traffic control, certification of new
aircraft, and inspection of the existing fleet of aircraft.
The 10 percent ticket tax, while administratively simple,
does not reflect the costs of providing services.
Passengers that pay higher fares and airlines that charge
higher fares pay more in taxes to support the system
than do discount passengers and airlines, even when the
two groups impose equal costs on the FAA. That fee
structure creates a competitive advantage for discount
carriers. 
A coalition of major airlines proposed an alternative fee
structure: a flat fee of $4.50 on each originating passen-
ger, a fee of $2 on each originating seat on larger jets
and $1 on other planes, and $.0005 per mile of distance
between origin and destination. In a report on the pro-
posal, the GAO noted the proposal would, not surpris-
ingly, shift user-fee payments from the major carriers to
discount carriers. A discount carrier flying directly
between two cities would pay the same fees as a major
carrier flying from the origin to a hub and then from the
hub to the destination city. The major carriers, however,
impose greater costs on the FAA by having two takeoffs
and landings and by flying a longer total distance.
When fee structures cannot be closely tied to the costs
of providing service, they cannot be easily defended,
and agencies should expect both frequent debate about
the fairness of existing fee structures and frequent pro-
posals to shift fee responsibility to other users.
Table 2-- Selected fee-reliant Federal agencies
User fees as
Agency percent of outlays (FY96)
Food and agriculture agencies
Agricultural Marketing Service  81
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 30
Food and Drug Administration 10
Food Safety and Inspection Service 13
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 54
Natural resource agencies
Bureau of Reclamation 83
Minerals Management Service 73
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 13
United States Fish and Wildlife Service 36
United States Forest Service 28
Other regulatory agencies
Comptroller of the Currency 106
Farm Credit Administration 95
Federal Communications Commission 73
Federal Trade Commission 65
Immigration and Naturalization Service 38
National Credit Union Administration 129
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 98
Office of Thrift Supervision 113
Patent and Trademark Office 109
Securities and Exchange Commission 86
United States Customs Service 70
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office, “Federal User Fees: Budgetary Treatment, 
Status, and Emerging Management Issues,” GAO/AIMD-98-11, December 1997.
Note: Some agencies receive fee revenues that exceed outlays, either because they













































































Agency   Activities financed by user fees   Fee characteristics
Agricultural Marketing Service 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Food and Drug Administration
Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Grading, inspection, and quality assurance for 235
agricultural commodities and for processing plants.
Fees finance about 75% of AMS budget.
Veterinary Services¾inspection of imported animals
and birds; animal products, byproducts, semen and
embryos; export certificate endorsements; tests; and
establishment approvals.
Agricultural Quarantine and Inspection¾inspection of
international passengers, aircraft, trucks, railcars, and
vessels.
Expansion (compared to 1992 base) of resources for
review of new drug applications. Inspection, compli-
ance, and post-market surveillance activities are
financed through appropriations. Fees are waived for
orphan drugs, new businesses, and other public health
reasons.
Grain and rice inspection and weighing; commodity
inspection for USDA purchases. Compliance, standard
setting, and methods development funded through
appropriations.
Fees cover all costs of inspection and agency over-
head for seafood products and processing plants.
Some support activities (research, standard setting,
international negotiation and information) are financed
through authorization.
Fees cover all agency activities except high level waste
activities and certain activities for the Department of
Energy. Includes licensing and inspection for: nuclear
reactors and other nuclear facilities; the processing,
handling, and export of nuclear material; nuclear waste
repositories. Also includes research and accident and
incident investigations.
Modern program dates from 1946; FY97 revenues
were $164 million. Based on hourly fees for inspector
services, with adjustments for guaranteed volumes.
Separate testing charges; overhead recovered
through volume-based charges for some commodities
and hourly surcharges for others.
Overtime fees in place since 1950's, others since
1991. FY96 fee revenues were $164 million, about
30% of APHIS budget. Cost-based charges per ani-
mal, vessel, aircraft, truck, railcar, passenger, estab-
lishment, or test, with some additional charges based
on inspector hours. Exemptions for tests with signifi-
cant public health impacts.
Program dates from 1992; FY96 fee revenues were
$85 million. One-third of revenue comes from applica-
tion fees for new drugs, one-third from annual fees on
existing drugs, and one-third from annual fees on
manufacturing plants.
FY97 fee revenues: $34 million. Based on hourly
inspector charges, which vary with volume commit-
ments and time of day or week.Test charges recov-
ered separately, and overhead recovered through vol-
ume charges.
Inspection has been fee supported since 1958. Fee
revenues have varied from $10-$13 million in recent
years. Fees are based on hourly charges for inspec-
tion, with variation for location, time of day and week,
and required skills (e.g., HACCP hourly charges are
higher).
Fees collected since 1960's. Fee revenues in FY97:
$462.3 million. Based on hourly charges for full costs
of inspection, license fees, and annual fees charged
to all active entities. Agency does not retain fee rev-
enues, but revenues by law must approximately match
full expenditures.
Source: ERS interviews with agency financial officers.
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Table 4¾ ¾An example of a user-fee structure: GIPSA charges
Panel 1¾ ¾Inspection and weighing service
Contract  Monday through Friday  Saturday  Overtime Holidays
Length & Sunday
6 am - 6 pm 6 pm -6 am
Dollars per hour (per service representative)
1 year 23.00 24.80 32.40 32.40 39.00
6 months 25.00 26.80 34.40 34.40 43.60
3 months 28.00 29.80 37.40 37.40 46.60
Noncontract 33.00 35.00 42.80 42.80 52.60
Panel 2¾ ¾Materials and equipment fees 
Dollars per test 
Test (assessed in addition to the hourly rate)
Aflatoxin (other than thin layer chromatography) 8.50
Aflatoxin (thin layer chromatography) 20.00
Soybean protein and oil (one or both) 1.50
Wheat protein, sunflower oil, or waxy corn (per test) 1.50
Vomitoxin (qualitative) 7.50
Vomitoxin (quantitative) 12.50




Panel 3¾ ¾Annual administrative fee 
(assessed on an accumulated basis on 10/1)
Metric tons of inspected grain Dollars per ton
1,000,000 or less 0.090
1,000,001 to 1,500,000 0.082
1,500,001 to 2,000,000 0.042
2,000,001 to 5,000,000 0.032
5,000,001 to 7,000,000 0.017
More than 7,000,000 0.00216 / USDA-ERS User-Fee Financing of USDA Meat and Poultry Inspection / AER-775 
Economic analysis can provide insight into several key
choices when designing user-fee systems. We cover four
issues: defining the goals of a user-fee program, the
conditions under which user fees should be used rather
than other financing mechanisms, designing an appro-
priate fee structure, and assessing the effect of fees on
retail and supplier prices.
Should Fees Aim To Finance Operations
or Change Behavior?
Most user-fee systems are designed to finance agency
operations. For example, GIPSA, APHIS, and AMS fees
are set to provide a steady and reliable source of funds
to support those agencies' activities. But fees could be
designed to change the behavior of feepayers. Excise
taxes imposed on manufacturers' purchases of chloroflu-
orocarbon gases (CFCs), for example, are designed to
change manufacturers' behavior by inducing them to
substitute other materials for CFCs, thus reducing CFC
emissions (Barthold, 1994). Similarly, FSIS user fees
could be designed to finance inspection operations, as
well as other FSIS activities, or their design could aim
to reduce pathogens in meat and, more generally, to
improve food safety.
The two goals often conflict. A system designed to
change behavior is usually not well designed to finance
activities. For that reason, decisionmakers must usually
choose one of the goals; they cannot achieve each with
the same fee system. Most agencies aim to finance
operations because that goal has often provided the
impetus for a shift to fees and because that is often a
more feasible goal. 
Agencies that have dual goals for charges will typically
rely on dual systems of charges. For example, an
agency might charge user fees to finance operations and
might also administer a system of fines for noncompli-
ance with agency rules. Usually, revenues from fines are
not commingled with user-fee revenues, but instead are
paid to the Treasury and become part of general Federal
revenues. We describe the reasons for conflict below,
using financial to refer to the goal of financing opera-
tions and behavioral to refer to the goal of changing
behavior.
The Basis for Fees
Agencies must decide on some basis for setting charges.
For example, GIPSA bases some charges on inspector
hours, others on the typical cost of materials and equip-
ment used in a test, and others on the volume of a firm's
production. CFC excise taxes vary directly with the
amount and type of CFC's purchased (gases with greater
potential for ozone depletion get higher taxes).
Financial Targets
If the goal is financial, fees should usually have a broad
basis to keep individual fee burdens small. Larger bur-
dens lead firms to take steps, either politically or
through the design of plant operations, to limit their
exposure and, therefore, to lower the amount of revenue
received. Fees should be based on factors whose use is
relatively insensitive to the fee to provide a stable fund-
ing source. GIPSA overhead charges are based on a
plant's volume of export grain, which is unlikely to be
affected by the charge. FDA obtains two-thirds of its
user-fee revenue from fixed charges on each existing
manufacturing plant and each registered prescription
drug. Because they are spread so widely, FDA user fees
are not large enough to cause plants to close and drugs
to be delisted. If the entire fee were placed on new drug
applications, some research might not be done and some
drugs might not be introduced.
Behavioral Targets
If the goal is behavioral, fees should be based on factors
whose use is sensitive to the fees. The reason for choos-
ing CFC charges is the view that high fees on their use
will lead manufacturers to find substitutes and use less
of them. These considerations argue for a narrow basis
(a few precisely defined actions that will incur fees). 
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The Level of Fees and Information
Needed To Set Them
Financial Targets
Fees must be set to recover the costs of agency opera-
tions. To design a fee structure, the agency will need
detailed information on the agency's costs of carrying
out various activities.
Behavioral Targets
Fees must be set high enough to stimulate payers to
change their behavior. These could be considerably
higher than fees set to realize financial targets. To
design a proper fee structure, the agency will need
detailed information on the likely responses of payers to
different fee levels. The existing statutory framework
treats fees that do not reflect costs as excise taxes. As a
practical matter, then, policies aimed at providing incen-
tives to improve food safety would have to be imple-
mented through taxes instead of user fees. 
The Temporal Stability of 
Fee Revenues
Financial Targets
Agency costs will change through time in response to
inflation, productivity growth, and changes in workload.
Agency revenues from a given fee structure will also
change with changes in the volume of industry activity.
Agencies will strive to match revenues to costs through
time by changing the level and structure of fees.
Behavioral Targets
If fees are successful, then revenues will fall over time.
If these fees are used to finance operations, then agen-
cies will need to find another source of funding. If fees
designed to change behavior have no effect, however,
then revenues may rise over time along with the phe-
nomena that they are supposed to deter, and agencies
will need to find uses for the revenues.
When Should User Fees Be Chosen 
To Finance Operations?
OMB guidelines establish Federal policy regarding fees
assessed for government services (OMB, 1993). The
guidelines, as revised in 1993, state that a user charge
should be assessed when a beneficiary of government
services receives special benefits, which are defined to
accrue when a government service does the following:
 enables a beneficiary to obtain more immediate or
substantial gains than those that accrue to the general
public; or
  provides business stability or contributes to public
confidence in the business activity of the beneficiary;
or
  is performed at the request of or for the convenience
of the recipient and is beyond the services regularly
received by other members of the industry or 
group or by the general public.7
These guidelines issued by OMB contain an important
change from the original user-charge guidelines issued
in 1959. The earlier version stated that "no charge
should be made for services when the identification of
the ultimate beneficiary is obscure and the service can
be primarily considered as benefitting broadly the gen-
eral public." The revised version relaxed that standard:
fees can be charged as long as the benefits to the public
are incidental to the special benefits provided to indus-
try.
The 1959 guidelines are fairly close to standards from
economic analysis (Fisher, 1988):
User-charge financing is more desirable the greater is
the share of benefits that accrue to direct recipients;
and
The efficiency case for user-charge financing of a
government service is stronger the more responsive is
demand for the service to its price.
Economic analysis suggests that user-fee financing of
meat and poultry inspection is problematic if inspection
provides public health benefits that primarily flow to
the general public. Furthermore, economic analysis
gives good reason to doubt the existence of special ben-
7OMB guidelines relate specifically to user charges assessed under
the IOAA (rather than under specific authorizing legislation), and
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efits of any significant size under 1993 guidelines in
OMB's Revised Circular No. 25. To the extent that
Federal inspection leads to increased profits for the
meat industry through increased demand or reduced
costs, those profits should be quickly passed through to
consumers as lower prices if the industry is competitive.
Empirical studies find little evidence of monopoly
power in the industry, and the best evidence suggests
that the industry is competitive (GIPSA, 1996;
Morrison, 1998).
Economic analysis suggests that user-fee financing may
be inappropriate under certain circumstances, and that
insight lies behind the original 1959 OMB guidance. At
first glance, meat, poultry and egg products inspection
activities appear to be activities for which user fees
would be inappropriate. However, we believe that
assessment of user fees would not impose substantial
costs on the economy and could generate benefits. The
economic guidelines cited above are concerned with the
effects of pricing on demand for a service. But because
Federal inspection is mandatory, the demand for inspec-
tion services should be unresponsive to the price of the
service (the user fee) and, as a result, user fees would
not change the quantity of inspection services used. As
a result, the imposition of user fees will have no effect,
positive or negative, in the context of the economic
guidelines outlined above. To understand why, we next
discuss the reasoning behind the two standards from
economic analysis.
User Fees and Allocative Efficiency
Direct users are those who pay the fees: slaughter and
processing establishments in the case of meat and poul-
try inspection. Meat consumers are indirect users of
inspection services because they gain public health ben-
efits from having their meats inspected but do not
directly pay the user fees.
When a fee accurately reflects the costs of providing a
service, direct users will purchase units of the service as
long as the benefits to them exceed costs. If direct users
obtain a large share of all the benefits from the service,
then we can reasonably say that the public will receive
the service as long as the benefits to the public exceed
the costs and that it is, therefore, worthwhile for gov-
ernment to provide the amount of the service that is
taken. But if direct users obtain only a small share of
the benefits from a service, then we cannot say that the
public is receiving services as long as benefits to the
public exceed costs. Indeed, further expansion of the
service could easily provide more benefits to the public
that exceed the additional costs even if the additional
costs outweigh the benefits to direct users.
Direct users and their share of benefits become an issue
only if the demand for the service is sensitive to the size
of the fee. If demand is sensitive, then general revenue
financing (and a consequent zero price of using the ser-
vice) could lead to a large expansion of the service, and
impose substantial additional costs on the taxpayers,
even though the expansion yields minimal additional
benefits (direct users would use the service as long as
the benefits exceeded price, set to zero). Alternatively, a
user fee set at an inappropriately high level could choke
off use of the service, even if the benefits from addi-
tional use substantially exceeded the costs to society of
additional services. When demand is sensitive to the
fee, user fees could serve a useful metering function,
leading the government to provide additional units of
the service only as long as the benefits to the public
exceeded costs. Economists use the term allocative effi-
ciency to refer to the proper amount of a good or ser-
vice to provide. A price system induces people to use a
service as long as their valuation of the service exceeds
the price. If the price is also the cost of providing the
service, then the price system will induce people to use
a service as long as their valuation exceeds the cost of
providing it.
However, because Federal inspection is mandatory for
meat and poultry products shipped in interstate com-
merce, the demand for inspection services will not be
sensitive to the fee. If imposition of a fee and variations
in the fee do not cause changes in Federal inspection
services, then the economic standards stated above are
irrelevant. Fees can neither improve nor diminish
allocative efficiency in inspection services if they do
not affect the volume of services provided.
Some FSIS services (e.g., some testing and information
provision) may indeed be voluntary and therefore
potentially price sensitive. Those sorts of services
would be subject to the economic standards: economic
theory suggests that user fees should not be applied to
those services if direct users gain a small share of bene-
fits or if demand is price sensitive. Moreover, inspection
user fees could affect allocative efficiency in the meat
industry if the fees themselves (as distinct from the reg-
ulation that they finance) caused some establishments to
close. However, it should be possible to design a fee
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User Fees and Productive Efficiency
Economists frequently refer to concepts of efficiency:
allocative efficiency, the subject of the previous section,
refers to proper amount of a service to offer; productive
efficiency refers to the costs incurred in providing a
given quantity of a service. Economic analysis offers
three guidelines for user fees that relate to productive
efficiency:
 Direct users of a service must be identified, and it
must be possible to exclude them, at reasonable cost,
from consuming the service if they don't pay; 
  User fees can create administrative costs for govern-
ment providers and compliance costs for direct users.
These costs should be small in relation to the benefits
of a fee system;
 User fees can increase productive efficiency (reduce
costs) of a service if the fee system generates new
information on costs and production of program 
activities.
The first and second guidelines are clear. A government
agency needs to identify direct users and get them to
pay the fee. The process of collecting fees creates new
costs for the agency and compliance costs for direct
users because each must now make, record, and review
payments. In general, these costs will substantially
exceed any savings realized through reduced support
from general revenues because the system for adminis-
tering and paying for general revenues remains in place.
Compliance and administrative costs are real costs to
society because they represent labor, capital, and mate-
rials that could have been applied to other pursuits.
User fees do offer one relatively unexplored but impor-
tant opportunity for efficiency gains. Administration of
a fee system brings costs but also often generates new
information relating detailed program costs to regulato-
ry activities and sometimes to program outcomes.
Improved information can allow program managers to
operate more effectively by allocating resources to their
most productive uses and by identifying reasons for
unusual cost overruns. Economists use the term pro-
ductive efficiency to refer to the provision of a given
amount of services at the least cost.
Economic theory often proceeds under the simplifying
assumption of productive efficiency¾that firms and
agencies already operate at least cost. As a result, theory
summaries often cite only the other criteria, such as
allocative efficiency and administrative costs. But the
simplifying assumption can be misleading. Prior to the
deregulation of transportation industries in the United
States in 1975-84, most economic analyses of the
effects of regulation emphasized allocative
efficiency¾whether regulation caused shifts in industry
outputs. But retrospective evaluations of the effects of
reform found that regulation often affected productive
efficiency--regulation caused important increases in
costs. The simplifying assumption limited good eco-
nomic analysis in the pre-reform period.
The primary economic criteria framing the decision to
impose user fees are not particularly relevant for meat
inspection as long as the volume of services provided is
unaffected by the fee. A fee system will generate admin-
istrative costs that exceed those imposed by reliance on
general revenues. As a result, the economic case for
user fees must rely on the possibility that user fees will
lead to more efficient operation of the inspection system
and on the uncertainties associated with obtaining gen-
eral revenue financing.
How Should Fees Be Set?
Once the decision is made to fund a government-pro-
vided good or service with a user fee, the agency must
decide on the amount and structure of the fee. Should
the fee be a fixed charge to each direct user¾ a license
fee? Or should it be based on units of use, such as $30
per inspector hour? The charge per unit could also vary
with the number of units, as it does with GIPSA, which
recovers administrative costs through a charge of 9
cents per ton for the first million tons of export grain, a
charge that falls steadily to 0.2 cent for volumes over 7
million tons. User-fee systems could also contain com-
bined fees that reflect combinations of license fees, spe-
cific service fees, service usage charges, and volume-
based charges. In general, a variety of different fee
structures could each raise the same amount of revenue.
The appropriate fee structure depends upon the goal one
is trying to reach with the user-fee system and the
nature of the service provided.
Most user-fee systems are designed to finance the
agency. They may also be aimed at helping the agency
operate efficiently by producing services for which ben-
efits to society are at least equal to costs and by produc-
ing services in the most cost-effective manner. The pri-
mary rule for setting fees is the same for each of these
goals: fees for specific services should reflect the incre-
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incremental cost is the additional cost the agency bears
by providing an additional unit of service. In the case of
inspection services, the incremental cost of inspection
services provided to a plant includes the number of
inspector hours included in a service, priced at the value
of the wages and fringe benefits associated with those
hours, plus the costs associated with supervising inspec-
tion hours.
Incremental inspection costs can vary, as they do with
GIPSA, with the time at which services are used
(evening, overtime, weekend or holiday), if those times
impose higher wage costs on the agency. They can also
vary with the quantity of services provided (irregular
and low-volume services impose higher costs on an
agency because they generate more travel time and
inspector downtime), and with the types of services pro-
vided. Effectively run user-fee systems impose great
demands on agencies to accurately measure costs if they
are to be accurately priced.
Most agencies also carry fixed costs associated with
management, standard setting, research, and compli-
ance. These costs cannot be reliably attributed to the
actions of particular payers, and there is no one best
way to set those fees. Often, an effective way to recover
fixed costs is through charges on bases that are insensi-
tive to the fee. For example, GIPSA recovers overhead
costs through a per-ton charge on inspected grain, while
AMS recovers overhead costs for poultry grading
through a fixed charge per carcass. Such charges are rel-
atively small since they are imposed on a large base.
They likely will be passed through as small increases in
retail prices (again spread widely among all ultimate
beneficiaries of the service). The charges are easy to
administer since the agencies already monitor carcasses
and export volumes through their activities.
User fees generate costs of administering the program,
and an agency needs to be alert to these costs. In FY
1998, the NRC expects to collect about $94.6 million in
fees for inspections and licensing services. Fees for 105
reactors account for about 89 percent of that amount,
while fees from approximately 6,000 materials licensees
account for less than 2 percent. NRC costs for determin-
ing the fee requirements and processing fee payments
for the 6,000 entities amount to a substantial portion of
the total costs of administering the fee program. The
agency must invest significant resources compared to
the small amount recovered from this class of licensees. 
Incidence: Who Ultimately Pays 
for the User Fee?
The economic incidence of a user fee is the analysis of
which individuals (or groups) bear the ultimate burden
of the fee. The group that is legally required to pay a
tax or fee to the government is not necessarily the group
that ultimately bears the burden of that tax or fee
because individuals and firms will change their behav-
ior in response to the tax or fee in an attempt to shift the
burden to others.
Take the case of a user fee levied on meatpackers.
Meatpackers could try to pass on this increase in pro-
duction costs to consumers in the form of higher prices.
But consumers could react to higher prices by buying
less meat. In general, if consumers are extremely sensi-
tive to a price increase (that is, if they sharply reduce
their purchases of meat in response to a price increase),
then meatpackers will be able to pass little of their high-
er costs through in the form of a price increase. If con-
sumers are quite insensitive to price increases, then
much or all of the cost increase will ultimately be
passed through to consumers in the form of a price
increase.
If consumers were so price sensitive that demand fell
sharply in response to an increase in meat prices, then
meatpackers would also purchase fewer cattle, hogs,
and poultry. Falling demand for livestock could then
lead to lower livestock prices. If that should occur,
meatpackers could attempt to shift the incidence of the
fee back to livestock producers. The extent to which
meatpackers could be successful in passing costs back
to producers depends on how sensitive livestock pro-
duction is to changes in livestock prices. If producers
are insensitive to prices and do not change cattle num-
bers in response to changes in cattle prices, then much
of the cost increase will be passed back to livestock
producers in the form of lower animal prices.
Alternatively, if cow-calf operations do produce
markedly fewer animals in response to price declines,
then meatpackers will not be able to pass back the cost
increase.
What is likely to happen in response to meat, poultry,
and egg products user fees? Because production costs
for all meat and poultry products will be rising slightly
because of the user fee, beef consumers will have little
incentive to shift to pork or chicken. The retail price
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the demand for beef, or chicken, or pork¾and the
demand for all meat is rather insensitive to price
changes.
ERS estimates that meat consumption falls by only 0.34
percent when meat prices rise by 1.0 percent. That esti-
mate may overstate consumer price sensitivity because
it is based on meat consumed at home; the retail
demand for meat consumed away from home may be
even less sensitive to changes in wholesale meat prices.
In contrast, producer supply response is likely to be
considerably more responsive to price changes, particu-
larly over longer periods of time. As a result, most of
the modest increases in production costs associated with
imposition of user fees will likely be passed through as
higher retail prices for meat.
The form of a fee also matters. For example, the user
fee imposed by the FDA for new drug review is
designed in such a way that pharmaceutical companies
have little incentive to pass it forward to consumers or
backward to suppliers. The burden falls on the compa-
nies and, ultimately, on their stockholders.8 But it is
highly unlikely that a similar fee could be designed for
meatpacking plants. 
The FDA designed fees that do not vary with plant out-
put¾a fixed registration charge on each existing drug
and a fixed annual fee on each manufacturing facility.
Economic theory suggests that such fees will not affect
drug prices or drug research. They could cause a plant
or product line to shut down if the fee caused total plant
or product costs to exceed drug revenues; however, total
manufacturing costs are such a small share of drug rev-
enues that this is unlikely. In the drug industry, a large
part of all costs is fixed. Research and development
costs, and most costs of drug promotion, do not vary as
sales of a particular drug change. The variable costs of
making more units of a drug is a very small share of
revenues and of total costs. The industry's cost and rev-
enue structure allows for the imposition of fees that are
borne by stockholders.
In contrast, the variable costs of livestock purchase and
processing account for an overwhelming share of total
meat and poultry slaughter and processing costs. Fixed
costs are small shares of the total, and gross profit mar-
gins are low enough that FDA-like fees would likely
cause some plants to shut down. As a result, feasible
meat and poultry inspection fees will likely have to be
based on factors that vary with output (such as meat
production or inspector hours) and will, therefore, pri-
marily fall elsewhere than on the firm's owners.
8The firms and their stockholders will also reap benefits from the
faster reviews funded by the fee because faster reviews mean that a
patented drug will get to the market sooner. By getting to market
sooner, the drug will be under patent protection for a longer part of
its commercial life, and commercially successful new drugs will,
therefore, reap higher profits because of effectively greater patent
protection. The public will also benefit by more rapid commercial
introduction of effective drugs.FSIS faces a complicated regulatory task. The more
than 6,000 Federally inspected establishments perform
different functions. At the broadest level, one must dis-
tinguish between plants that slaughter live animals from
those that process meat that has been slaughtered else-
where. Slaughter plants typically specialize by species,
with cattle, hogs, chickens, and turkeys being the prima-
ry (but certainly not the only) species. Plants also vary
by size, with the largest plants operating two shifts per
day, while many smaller plants operate on irregular
schedules. Inspection tasks and the costs that they
impose on FSIS typically vary with plant characteristics
of function, species, and size. Moreover, FSIS spends
money on tasks other than meat-plant inspection,
including import and egg products inspection, diagnos-
tic testing, standard setting, and label review. An inclu-
sive system of user fees needs to recover costs for all
agency activities, and an effective system of fees needs
to be sensitive to how inspection costs vary with plant
function, species mix, and size. 
Fee Structures
In principle, FSIS could base fees on one or more of a
variety of measurement bases. FSIS could base fees on:
 an hourly fee, based on an hourly rate for inspection
time;
 a volume fee, based on production volume, such as
pounds of inspected meat;
 a value fee, based on gross plant sales or on plant
employment;
 a service fee, based on rates specified for each specif-
ic task; and
 an annual license fee, which could vary with the size
(sales or employment) of the plant.
Information Requirements
Each of these fee bases has different information
requirements, and FSIS does not have the necessary
information for all of them. Currently, FSIS can reliably
identify the amount of time spent in inspection tasks at
different plants. The agency also maintains reliable
information on carcasses and carcass weights at slaugh-
ter plants. This information is collected by FSIS during
inspection operations; each piece of information is easy
to measure and difficult for plants to manipulate.
Other USDA agencies currently charge fees for labora-
tory services. If FSIS does not now develop cost esti-
mates for the time, materials, and equipment used in
laboratory tasks, the agency could do so in the future
without great difficulty.
The same cannot be said for measures of employment
and plant sales. Neither is collected as part of normal
FSIS inspection operations. FSIS does not have precise
measures of plant employment or sales but rather
obtains estimates from a consultant. Plant employment
estimates (approximate in that a range is reported) are
routinely collected and published by private sector mar-
keting services firms that carry out their own surveys.
Those firms then estimate sales figures by multiplying
estimated employment by average sales per worker in
the relevant industry; average sales measures are
derived from U.S. Census data. The resulting employ-
ment estimate is quite approximate, and the sales esti-
mate is more so. Firms whose fees were based on this
estimate would have strong incentives to understate or
to reduce employment. The incentive to lay off workers
would be particularly strong for annual license fees,
which typically jump substantially at discrete thresh-
olds, such as 20, 100, or 500 workers. Plants that other-
wise would be just over a threshold would face very
strong incentives to restrict output and employment to
get under the threshold and thereby reduce fee pay-
ments.
Designing a Fee Structure
ERS believes that inspection costs are best recovered
through an hourly fee based on an hourly rate applied to
inspection hours. Experience in other agencies, other
countries, and in current FSIS user fees (for overtime)
suggests that this approach is feasible. Given the infor-
mation available to FSIS, an hourly-based fee best
reflects the costs to FSIS of conducting inspection ser-
vices. Fees that are cost-based are easier to defend to
industry representatives and to government oversight
agencies. Fees based on the costs of providing services
can allow the agency to operate more efficiently
because they lead the agency to develop detailed infor-
mation relating costs to agency actions. Fees can
improve efficiency indirectly when they induce firms to
use inspection resources in low-cost ways.
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If hourly fees are to reflect costs, the agency will need
to develop hourly rates that vary with costs. Fees should
be adjusted for differences in time of day and day of
week, plant location, inspection skills required, and vol-
ume commitments if these allow the agency to operate
with less inspector downtime. Fees should reflect the
full costs of providing inspection services. In addition to
inspector wages, fees also should reflect benefits, travel
and downtime, inspector training, report writing, review
actions, and the costs of supervisory staff.
Ideally, hourly fees would be designed to recover only
the costs associated with plant inspection. Separate
charges could be developed for testing and consulting
services and for agency overhead. Hourly fees do not
have to be based on actual hours at the plant, especially
if there is concern that such a basis could generate
unnecessary conflicts between inspectors and plant
managers. Fees could instead be prospectively based on
typical hours and tasks for a plant of the type being
inspected. Those fees would require a substantial
agency investment in information systems. 
Although overhead costs, to the extent that they are not
directly related to inspection actions, can be recovered
through add-ons to hourly charges, the process could
lead to some disincentive effects. Instead, overhead
could be recovered through charges on volume or
through per-plant registration fees. Volume fees are like-
ly to be small enough to avoid any disincentives, and
the agency maintains reasonably good information on
measures of slaughter volume. If the agency incurs
costs associated with plant registration and record keep-
ing, it may improve efficiency by imposing annual plant
fees that reflect those costs. However, because of the
extremely wide range of plant sizes in the meat sector
and the very large number of small plants, FSIS should
be alert to the possibility that fixed plant fees will intro-
duce disincentive effects: plants might close because of
the fee, or they might choose to downsize or to hide the




The elements of financial management frequently
involve choices and often require negotiations. If user
fees are to be introduced, FSIS should strive to obtain
investment authority over its reserves, even though most
agencies do not have such authority. Investment authori-
ty can provide the agency with additional funds of
between 1 percent and 6 percent of annual fee revenue
depending on interest rates and the amount of money
retained in reserve accounts. 
Spending authority matters. At the very least, the
agency must obtain the authority to spend fee revenue;
without that, the fees simply go to general revenues and
fail to benefit the agency, the industry, or the consumer.
The agency should also aim to gain spending authority
that is as unencumbered as possible because restrictions
make agency planning more difficult.
Reserve Funds
FSIS will need to set goals for reserves based on its
accrued liabilities and an estimate of the likelihood of
paying those liabilities. In principle, FSIS would be
responsible for the total cost of employee accrued liabil-
ities, including the value of accrued leave balances,
workers compensation payment liabilities, shut-down
costs for office closures, severance pay, and unemploy-
ment costs. However, when individual offices close or
when programs are downsized, some employees quickly
find other employment. As they leave, their accrued lia-
bilities also leave. In setting a goal for reserve balances,
this difference between accrued liabilities and actual
payments made must be estimated to avoid setting
reserve balance goals higher than necessary. The reserve
balance goal should also consider variations in revenues
collected relative to outlays. Shortfalls are likely to
occur in years when animal slaughter and meat con-
sumption are relatively low. In such cases plants will
use fewer inspector hours and tests than normal, and
user-fee revenues would fall below expected amounts.
Because animal slaughter in the United States does not
vary much from year to year, FSIS is unlikely to require
a reserve as large as a year's outlays, but is more likely
to be able to operate with a much smaller reserve bal-
ance to cover variations in revenues collected.
Reserves can be built up from two sources: through
appropriations that are specifically designated for
reserve accounts at the time that a user-fee system is
introduced or by setting charges that yield revenues in
excess of outlays early in the application of a fee sys-
tem. A mixed approach would leave agency overhead,
including pensions and fringe benefits, to be financed
through annual appropriations. If fees are to cover only
expenses that are closely tied to industry production, the24 / USDA-ERS User-Fee Financing of USDA Meat and Poultry Inspection / AER-775 
agency would require a smaller reserve balance, regard-
less of how it was financed.
The actual design of reserve funds is important. Some
agencies use designated trust funds as sources of
reserve balances. Others are able to hold reserve bal-
ances in designated Treasury accounts. If an agency is
allowed to keep fees collected to finance operations, it
must quickly establish adequate reserve balances.
Fee Adjustment
Over time, FSIS expenses will change as inflation raises
the costs of inspection and the costs of equipment and
materials used in FSIS operations. The agency will need
to determine an effective fee-adjustment mechanism
when a user-fee system is first authorized. FSIS should
resist statutory fee setting because adjustment will then
require statutory action. Instead, FSIS should aim for
statutory authority to set fees, while leaving the actual
design of fees to the rulemaking process. The agency
also should set fees for several years in a single rule-
making, a step that is more feasible in an atmosphere of
low and predictable inflation. If the agency can set fees
for several years at a time, it can limit its own resources
spent on rulemaking, and it can provide firms with the
necessary information for longer term planning.
Incentive Concerns
Avoiding Gaming
FSIS-regulated establishments can be classified into
such different interest groupings as slaughter vs. pro-
cessing, large vs. small, or red meat vs. poultry. Once a
user-fee system is in place, USDA and FSIS should
expect frequent proposals for amendment from interest
groups and Congress. FSIS can limit gaming and can
limit its own exposure to the costs of gaming by design-
ing an original system that is based, as much as possi-
ble, on the costs of inspection. By creating a system
based on costs, the agency can avoid being charged
with arbitrary decisions. The agency also can set a stan-
dard for interest groups to follow: interest groups must
provide proposals that are cost-based or offer strong
reasons to depart from costs if the proposals are to be
taken seriously. Such a rule will allow the agency to
limit its own expenditure of management resources in
debates over fee structures.
Avoiding Plant Closures and Layoffs
Fees that are applied to all plants and that are based on
incremental inspection costs will impose small per
pound costs on plants; plants are unlikely to close or to
alter their operations because of such fees. But some
types of fees could have important effects. 
In some user-fee proposals, FSIS has suggested issuing
licenses. To raise significant amounts of money, the
license charges would have to be fairly large. Fees
would have to be based on plant size and set at low lev-
els for small plants, then rising to significant amounts¾
more than $500,000 for the largest plants¾to prevent
small plants from closing. Such a system, however,
would likely create incentive effects for plants near any
breakpoint. A plant just below a breakpoint would have
strong incentives to avoid expansion if it entailed a
large increase in license fees. The problem for FSIS
would then be threefold: the user-fee system would
unnecessarily distort firms' decisions to produce meat,
some firms would complain that FSIS was keeping
them from expanding, and some firms would have
strong incentives to misreport output if that would limit
their fees.
Encouraging Testing, Training, and Diagnostic
Services
FSIS performs some functions not required by law, such
as some voluntary testing procedures, advice, and train-
ing; it may offer substantially more in the future under
HACCP rules. Functions not required by statute may be
sensitive to price. Firms may decide not to use them if a
fee is charged. If those price-sensitive functions also
have public health benefits, then the imposition of user
fees may reduce public health benefits.
The agency needs to identify any specific functions that
may be sensitive to prices¾that is, for which the vol-
ume of services used can be expected to vary with the
size of the user fee. It then needs to decide which of
those functions generate significant benefits to the pub-
lic that are beyond any benefits to direct payers. Those
functions that generate public benefits and are sensitive
to prices may be harmed by user fees, and the agency
could provide incentives for the use of those services by
limiting fees or by providing them at no charge. It could
then recover costs through appropriations or through
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Argentina
Dr. Luis Barcos, president of Argentina's meat inspec-
tion agency SENASA, wrote the following unofficial
translation to Mr. Gary Groves, Agricultural Counselor:
Those establishments qualified by SENASA for
slaughter, storage, or elaborate products, subproducts
and derivatives of animal origin, have to pay a monthly
fee for the Inspection Service they get from SENASA.
This fee is established through the regulations of Fees
for Inspection Services that prescribes the charges for
the different activities in the establishments. Its annual
income is approximately US$40,000,000 from which
US$27,000,000 come from fees paid for slaughtered
animal by specie (US$1.85 per head slaughtered bovine,
US$1.37 slaughtered pork, US$0.013 per slaughtered
chicken or hen, etc.) and the rest, US$13,000,000 from
activities like deboning, cold cut elaboration, cooked
meat, offal, tinned meat, etc. where fees are determined
according to the volume of production. There is no dis-
crimination in current fees regarding the destination of
the elaborated products (domestic consumption or
exports) as they affect slaughtering activities or elabora-
tion in its productive level, paying for each of them.
Current income is used to cover direct or indirect
expenses originated from the inspection service, conse-
quently in order to finance the activity, support from
users is requested. There exist other fees for other types
of control and related to establishments' activities such
as residues, chloros, anabolics, etc. (laboratory) and for
doing the administrative paperwork. The inspectors are
present at all times during the slaughter process.
Australia
In the mid-1980's, the Australian Government issued a
policy decision that required all agencies, wherever pos-
sible, to recover fees for services provided. Many of
these agencies had provided non-chargeable, or commu-
nity obligation services, which were funded by tax dol-
lars. Each agency had to determine how to recover the
cost of its services.
The Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection Service
(AQIS), a unit of the Australian Department of Primary
Industries and Energy, is responsible for functions per-
formed by FSIS and by APHIS in the United States.
Because of the differences in functions, the AQIS estab-
lished different methodologies for user fees for export
meat inspection and animal-related activities.
When the concept of cost recovery was introduced, the
AQIS needed to determine the best method to capture
100 percent of the cost to inspect export meat products.
Australia's Treasury Department developed a program
for cost recovery which would reflect what it consid-
ered the true cost of inspection. This agency's true cost
includes inspector and veterinarian salaries plus any
additional overhead the AQIS incurs, such as benefits,
headquarters staff, and facilities expenses. User fees
were introduced to the meat industry on a gradual basis.
A 40-percent user fee was introduced, followed by an
increase to 60 percent, and to 100 percent in 1991. It
was determined that a phased-in approach would help
offset adverse reactions from the industry.
Brian Macdonald of the Meat Inspection Division of the
AQIS responded to FSIS in a November 19, 1997, FAX
as follows:
In the Australian domestic sector a registration fee paid
by individual registered establishments to the respective
State government meat regulatory authority is used to
finance government inspection activity. This fee sup-
ports registration, standard setting, legislation, accredit-
ing and approving auditors, applying sanctions, etc.
Registered establishments must have a fully comprehen-
sive HACCP-based Quality Assurance (QA) system
approved by the State regulatory authority. Within this
framework, companies employ their own fully qualified
meat inspectors. The system is subject to regular audit
by accredited third party auditors approved by the
State.
User fees relating to quarantine services are based on a
fee schedule which includes hourly, daily, and unit
rates. Brian Macdonald also wrote: 
The Australian export sector is supervised by the
Federal Government and operates on a full cost recov-
ery basis. This system involves government on-plant
veterinary officers and meat inspectors and is super-
vised and audited by senior technical managers (veteri-
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nary circuit supervisors). A charging regime is main-
tained which includes: fee for service for inspectors, on-
plant veterinarians and senior technical managers
audits; a registration fee for the program's overhead
structure; and documentation fees.
The cost of the inspection program is fully recovered
from user fees. User fees are developed in consultation
with industry. Broadly speaking, fees are set to finance
the cost of the specific service to which they relate. 
Government inspectors are present at all times during
slaughter operations in all export abattoirs in Australia.
Government inspectors are not necessarily present at all
times during processing operations. The Australian
export meat industry has access to QA arrangements
approved and supervised by AQIS which enable certain
further processing operations to occur without the
immediate and constant supervision of government
inspectors. However, a peripatetic presence is main-
tained on a daily basis where importing country authori-
ties require it.
Resistance to user fees existed in both the inspection
force and the export meat companies. For the inspec-
tors, heavier workloads occurred as a result of a reduc-
tion in force, and the AQIS experienced a significant
increase in inspector absenteeism. AQIS executives met
with union officials to rectify some of the problems that
were occurring. One recommendation, which was
adopted, included providing inspectors with additional
opportunities for advanced skill training in HACCP,
microbiology, and other disciplines. Inspectors are now
referred to as Food Standard Officers with a wide range
of skills to offer.
Companies resisted the user fee charges and tried to
modify inspection standards, including facility layout,
equipment usage and overtime. The AQIS was pres-
sured to reduce the size of the inspection service and
establish a minimum number of inspectors on-site at
plants. AQIS conducted time and motion studies to
determine appropriate staffing levels for different plants
by considering the number of cattle slaughtered, facility
layout, and the time it takes to complete all aspects of a
task. The size of the inspection service was reduced as a
means to offer companies a minimum number of
inspection staff required at plants.
In November 1995, Australia's meat inspection program
received a bad review from FSIS: 6 of 30 establish-
ments were rated unacceptable and 8 plants received a
marginally acceptable rating. AQIS then reevaluated its
staffing levels and determined that three senior positions
were needed. It is also reconsidering if too many
inspection personnel were let go, if there is a need for
additional manpower, and how it would be funded. In
addition, the Agency has asked the Australian inspection
authorities to develop a plan to address the problems
that were encountered. The Australian government is
trying to work through these problems while  maintain-
ing a 100 percent user fee program.
Although the intent of issuing user fees was to achieve
100 percent cost recovery, the AQIS has still not been
able to balance its budget, and it receives approximately
12 percent from the community service obligation
(taxes). Meat plants are directly billed for services they
receive and are charged penalties if payment and fees
are not received on time.
In January 1998, the meat processing industry and John
Anderson, the Minister for Primary Industries and
Energy, announced a new agreement to defer $2.9 mil-
lion in increases in recovery of AQIS meat inspection
fees in future financial years and to reduce fees by $3.6
million for 1997/98 and by $1.4 million for 1998/99
(AQIS bulletin, 1997). Mr Anderson is quoted as say-
ing:
These changes mean the revenue collected from indus-
try will be the same as in 1996/97 and will give AQIS
an opportunity to implement the Government's reforms
to reduce the impost on industry even further. 
Small establishments are expected to benefit from this
new fee structure, including establishments that do not
slaughter meat and establishments that process for
emerging export industries such as pork, deer, and
ostrich  (AQIS Bulletin, 1997).
Canada
Canada did not respond to our information request, so
our discussion below is taken from the March 1996
User Fee Study developed by FSIS.
In May 1995, the Canadian Government started to
impose user fees to its many clients, including the meat
industry (98 percent of Canadian meat production is
subject to inspection). A primary reason for imposing
such fees was to reduce or recover some operating
costs, and to develop alternative means for delivering
inspection services. Agriculture and Agri-food Canadareviewed all inspection programs, and cost sharing
agreements were negotiated with all sectors. The fees
are the result of numerous consultations with the meat
industry pursuant to the Food Production and Inspection
(FBIP) Business Alignment Plan, 1992. Five cost recov-
ery initiatives were established, and the Meat Inspection
Regulations, 1990, were amended to include the follow-
ing user fee categories: overtime, inspection of regis-
tered establishments, label and recipe registration,
importation, and exportation. The user fees are based on
an hourly rate for overtime and set fees for the other
categories.
Although the Canadian user fee program is relatively
new, these amendments should help the Department to
meet its fiscal obligations by reducing inspection ser-
vices. The new fees also reflect the principle that the
primary beneficiary of the service, the meat industry,
should be expected to pay for the service. Agriculture
and Agri-Food Canada will conduct annual reviews of
the fees and services identified in the amendments, and
industry groups will have an opportunity to participate
in the reviews.
Denmark
Patrick Sondergaard of the Royal Danish Embassy
wrote the following FAX to Karen Stuck, FSIS:
Actual expenses for government inspection for
meat/poultry slaughter and processing for product pro-
duced for the domestic market are entirely financed by
the producing company. The same applies for produc-
tion for exports. User fees paid in accordance with the
above cover the actual costs of veterinary inspection of
meat and poultry. Cost recovery is assessed according to
actual expenses. Government inspectors are present at
all times during meat and poultry slaughter operations.
In meat processing establishments approved for exports,
government inspectors have until now been present at
all times during meat and poultry processing operations.
However, the Danish Veterinary and Food
Administration expects that with the implementation of
approved own check programs based on the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) system,
the requirements for the permanent presence of govern-
ment inspectors will be relaxed and adjusted according
to the approved own checks programs, the product
range, and the volume of production of the individual
establishments. Whatever the level of the above men-
tioned adjustment, government inspectors would how-
ever still be required to visit establishments at least
once a day.
Great Britain
R.A. Bell, Head Veterinary International Trade, Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) wrote the
following FAX to C. Scott, FSIS:
In Great Britain, the production of red meat intended
for sale for human consumption is covered by the Fresh
Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1995 (as
amended). These Regulations implement in Great
Britain the EC Fresh Meat Directive 91/497/EEC (as
amended by 95/23) and require all meat to be produced
to a single standard of hygiene under veterinary super-
vision. The day to day responsibility for meat inspection
and hygiene enforcement in licensed premises is carried
out by the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS), an Executive
Agency of MAFF.
From the MHS home page (9/27/96):
The Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) was launched on 1
April 1995. It took over from some 300 local authorities
responsibility for enforcing meat hygiene, inspection
and animal welfare and slaughter legislation in 1,875
licensed fresh meat premises in England, Scotland, and
Wales. Public health and animal welfare are safeguard-
ed in plants by Official Veterinary Surgeons and Meat
Inspectors working on inspection teams. The MHS
headquarters is based in York and there are six Regional
Offices located in Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh,
Taunton, Wolverhampton and York. 
Bell again reports the following:
Under the Regulations all licensed slaughterhouses
must be supervised by an Official Veterinary Surgeon
(OVS) of the MHS. Their principal role is to ensure that
meat intended for sale for human consumption is pro-
duced hygienically and to the standards set down in
law.
The OVS is also responsible for the overall supervision
of the plant including ante-mortem inspection of all ani-
mals, the post-mortem inspection of all carcasses and,
although it is not directly required under the
Regulations, the actual slaughter process. The OVS is
assisted by one or more fully trained and qualified meat
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inspectors. Their main duty is to assist with the post-
mortem inspection of carcasses, although they may also
assist the OVS with other activities.
Statutory requirements for the production of poultry
meat, which implement the Poultry Meat Directive
92/116/EEC are laid down in the Poultry Meat, Farmed
Game Bird Meat and Rabbit Meat (Hygiene and
Inspection) Regulations 1995. Inspection requirements
are similar to those for fresh meat. Once again,the
MHS isresponsiblefor enforcement inlicensedpremises.
Under European Community law, Great Britain is oblig-
ed to recoup costs for meat inspection from the industry.
Directive 85/73/EEC (as amended) requires meat
inspection charges to be made via a standard charge per
animal, or by charging actual costs. The Directive is
implemented in Great Britain by the Meat (Hygiene,
Inspection and Examination for Residues Charges)
Regulations 1995. Additional charges may also be
raised for the completion of veterinary health certifi-
cates to accompany exports of consignments. These
charges are again subject to cost recovery from the
industry. 
Japan
Mike Woolsey, Agricultural Attache for Foreign
Agricultural Service in Tokyo, reported in his
November 17, 1997, memo to FSIS that:
There are currently about 2,600 publicly employed
inspectors working in a total of 302 meat and poultry
slaughtering plants in Japan. Government meat inspec-
tion is financed by both public funds and user fees.
Salaries of the 2,600 meat inspectors are financed by
the Government of Japan and paid through local prefec-
tural governments. In addition, user fees are collected
by local prefectural governments to cover expenses
incurred by testing materials and overhead. The
Government of Japan sets the upper ceiling for the fee
that may be charged by each local government, which is
currently set at 1,300 yen per head. Within the above
limit, the actual fee is determined at the discretion of
each local government. Operating hours of the plant is
normally one day shift (i.e., 8:00-5:00). Inspections are
carried out during operating hours of the plant.
Korea
Korea reports that it does not rely on user fees.
Mexico
Octavio Carranza responded to Lewis Stockard, FAS/
Mexico, as follows: 
Inspection is financed through SAGAR for the plants
authorized to export meat and meat products. Some
plants which are not authorized to export are under the
supervision of SAGAR-approved veterinarians whose
payment is covered by that company. State supervisors
in charge of reviewing the activities of both official and
approved veterinarians are paid by SAGAR. The fees
paid for the approved veterinarians are 100 percent cov-
ered by the company. In the case of veterinarians
responsible for the establishments authorized to export,
the inspection cost are covered by SAGAR. The fees
charged to users in the case of approved veterinarians
are determined on the basis of the established (official)
minimum salary. The inspectors remain in the establish-
ment during its operations.
New Zealand
New Zealand's Meat Act requires the Ministry of
Agriculture (MAF) to recover the costs of government
inspection for slaughter and for processing from the
licensed processor. This applies both to the domestic
and export markets. MAF is in charge of both ante- and
post-mortem inspection. Sandra Newman, Executive
Manager at MAF, wrote to Maxine Yule, Agricultural
Assistant at the U.S. Embassy in Wellington: 
User fees cover not only the direct costs of inspection,
but also the indirect costs such as the cost of negotia-
tions with importing countries, setting standards, audit
of compliance, and the overhead costs of running the
Ministry of Agriculture, includingthe appropriate share of
the costsof theDirector General andhisteam,legal costs,
accommodation,depreciationandcapitalcharge, etc.
There is a complex budgeting and costing process
which determines the appropriate costs for each finan-
cial year. MAF works on a basis of being transparent
and accountable to the users for expenditure and con-
sults each year with the representatives of each sector
on these costs. For product on the New Zealand domes-
tic market, the requirements of the Meat Act and
Regulations must be met, i.e., full time presence is
required. Poultry for the domestic market is currently
regulated under the Food Act administered by the
Ministry of Health and full time presence is not speci-
fied under this Act.For product destined for domestic consumption, once it
leaves the slaughter and dressing process, the Food Act
applies and full time presence is not specified (process-
ing refers to all operations after completion of slaughter
and dressing). Product for export is handled in accor-
dance with the Meat Act and according to importing
country requirements. 
New Zealand's Technical Directive 95/160 states that
poultry processing is controlled by two departments, the
Ministry of Health and MAF, and: 
The premises can alternate between each jurisdiction
during a processing day. This situation does not allow
MAF to investigate an audit approach to surveillance. 
Technical Directive 95/130 specifies inspection and sur-
veillance requirement for poultry and states that in the
absence of ante- and post-mortem inspection certifica-
tion, inspectors are required to be on the premises dur-
ing the slaughter and processing of poultry product cov-
ered by other kinds of MAF health certification. Poultry
product for export requires both ante- and post-mortem
inspection.













































































Appendix table 1-Verbatim responses from foreign agencies to user-fee survey
Argentina Those establishments qualified by
SENASA for slaughter, storage, or elabo-
rate products, subproducts and derivatives
of animal origin, have to pay a monthly fee
for the Inspection Service they get from
SENASA. This fee is established through
the regulations of "Fees for Inspection
Services" that prescribes the charges for
the different activities in the establish-
ments.
Its annual income is approximately
US$40,000,000 from which
US$27,000,000 come from fees paid
for slaughtered animal by specie
(US$1.85 per head slaughtered
bovine, US$1.37 slaughtered pork,
US$0.013 per slaughtered chicken or
hen, etc.) and the rest, US$13,000,000
from activities like deboning, cold cut
elaboration, cooked meat, offal, tinned
meat, etc. where fees are determined
according to the volume of production.
There is no discrimination in current
fees regarding the destination of the
elaborated products (domestic con-
sumption or exports) as they affect
slaughtering activities or elaboration in
its productive level, paying for each of
them. Current income is used to cover
direct and indirect expenses originated
from the inspection service, conse-
quently in order to finance the activity,
support from users is requested.
There exist other fees for other types
of control and related to establish-
ments' activities such as residues,
chloros, anabolics, etc (laboratory) and
for doing the administrative paperwork.
The inspectors are present at all times
during the slaughter process.
continued--
Source: ERS/FSIS Survey of Meat Inspection Agencies
Country How do you finance inspection for             Are user fees used for any or all                Are inspectors present at all times? 















































































Appendix table 1-Verbatim responses from foreign agencies to user-fee survey¾continued
Australia
Canada
For the domestic sector, a registration fee is
paid by individual registered establish-
ments. For the export sector, a charging
regime is maintained which includes: a fee
for service for inspectors, on-plant veterinar-
ians and senior technical managers audits,
a registration fee for the program's over-
head structure, and documentation fees.
In May 1995, the Canadian government
started to impose user fees to its many
clients, including the meat industry.
Agriculture and Agri-food Canada reviewed
all inspection programs and cost sharing
agreements were negotiated with all sec-
tors. The fees are the result of numerous
consultations with the meat industry pur-
suant to the Food Production and
Inspection (FBIP) Business Alignment Plan,
1992. Five cost recovery initiatives were
established, and the Meat Inspection
Regulations, 1990, were amended to
include the following user fee categories: (1)
overtime, (2) inspection of registered estab-
lishments, (3) label and recipe registration,
(4) importation, and (5) exportation.
User fees are developed in consultation
with industry and are set to finance the
cost of the specific service to which they
relate.
The user fees are based on an hourly rate
for overtime and set fees for the other cate-
gories.
Inspectors are present at all times dur-
ing slaughter operations in all export




Source: ERS/FSIS Survey of Meat Inspection Agencies
Country How do you finance inspection for             Are user fees used for any or all                 Are inspectors present at all times? 














































































Appendix table 1-Verbatim responses from foreign agencies to user-fee survey¾continued
Denmark
Germany
Actual expenses for government inspection for
meat/poultry slaughter and processing for
product produced for the domestic market are
entirely financed by the producing company.
The same applies for production for exports.
No information provided, but EC directives
require member states to rely on user fees.
User fees cover the actual costs of veteri-
nary inspection of meat and poultry. Cost
recovery is assessed according to actual
expenses.
No information provided, but EC directives
require member states to base fees on
actual expenses or on uniform charges per
carcass.
Government inspectors are present at
all times during meat and poultry
slaughter operations. In meat process-
ing establishments approved for
exports, government inspectors have
until now been present at all times dur-
ing meat and poultry processing opera-
tions. However, the Danish Veterinary
and Food Administration expects that
with the implementation of approved
own check programs based on the
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points (HACCP) system, the require-
ments for the permanent presence of
government inspectors will be relaxed
and adjusted according to the approved
own checks programs, the product
range, and the volume of production of
the individual establishments. Whatever
the level of the above mentioned adjust-
ment, government inspectors would
however still be required to visit estab-
lishments at least once a day.
No information provided.
continued--
Source: ERS/FSIS Survey of Meat Inspection Agencies
Country How do you finance inspection for            Are user fees used for any or all              Are inspectors present at all times? 















































































Appendix table 1-Verbatim responses from foreign agencies to user-fee survey¾continued
Great Britain
Japan
Under European Community law, Great
Britain is obliged to recoup costs for meat
inspection from the industry.
Government meat inspection is financed by
both public funds and user fees. Salaries of
the 2,600 meat inspectors are financed by
the Government of Japan and paid through
local prefectural governments. In addition,
user fees are collected by local prefectural
governments to cover expenses incurred by
testing materials and overhead.
Directive 85/73/EEC (as amended)
requires meat inspection charges to be
made via a standard charge per animal, or
by charging actual costs. The Directive is
implemented in Great Britain by the Meat
Hygiene (Inspection and Examination for
Residues Charges) Regulations 1995.
Additional charges may also be raised for
the completion of veterinary health certifi-
cates to accompany exports of consign-
ments. These charges are again subject to
cost recovery from the industry.
The Government of Japan sets the upper
ceiling for the fee that may be charged by
each local government, which is currently
set at 1,300 yen per head. Within the
above limit, the actual fee is determined at
the discretion of each local government.
The day to day responsibility for meat
inspection and hygiene enforcement in
licensed premises is carried out by the
Meat Hygiene Service (MHS), an
Executive Agency of Ministry of
Agriculture Fishery and Food. Under the
Regulations all licensed slaughterhous-
es must be supervised by an Official
Veterinary Surgeon (OVS) of the MHS.
Their principal role is to ensure that
meat intended for sale for human con-
sumption is produced hygienically and
to the standards set down in law.
The OVS is also responsible for the
overall supervision of the plant including
ante-mortem inspection of all animals,
the post-mortem inspection of all car-
casses and, although it is not directly
required under the Regulations, the
actual slaughter process. The OVS is
assisted by one or more fully trained
and qualified meat inspectors. Their
main duty is to assist with the post-
mortem inspection of carcasses,
although they may also assist the OVS
with other activities.
Operating hours of the plant is normally
one day shift (i.e., 8:00-5:00).
Inspections are carried out during oper-
ating hours of the plant.
continued--
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Inspection is financed through SAGAR for
the plants authorized to export meat and
meat products. Some plants which are not
authorized to export are under the supervi-
sion of SAGAR-approved veterinarians
whose payment is covered by that company.
State supervisors in charge of reviewing the
activities of both official and approved vet-
erinarians are paid by SAGAR.
The costs of government inspection for
meat and poultry slaughter and processing
are covered by the licensed processor. This
applies both to the domestic and export
markets. User fees cover not only the direct
costs of inspection, but also the indirect
costs such as the cost of negotiations with
importing countries; setting standards; audit
of compliance; and the overhead costs of
running the Ministry of Agriculture¾includ-
ing the appropriate share of the costs of the
Director General and his team; legal costs;
accommodation; depreciation and capital
charge etc.
Not applicable
The fees charged to users in the case of
approved veterinarians are determined on
the basis of the established (official) mini-
mum salary.
There is a complex budgeting and costing
process which determines the appropriate
costs for each financial year. MAF works on
a basis of being transparent and account-
able to the users for expenditure and con-
sults each year with the representatives of
each sector on these costs.
Not applicable
The inspectors remain in the establish-
ment during its operations.
A full-time presence is required for meat in
the domestic market but not for poultry in
the domestic market. For product destined
for domestic consumption, once it leaves
the slaughter and dressing process the
Food Act applies and full time presence is
not specified. Product for export is han-
dled in accordance with the Meat Act and
according to importing country require-
ments
Source: ERS/FSIS Survey of Meat Inspection Agencies
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processing?